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Components of social perception include the ability to recognise and interpret both verbal
and non-verbal emotional cues, such as vocal tone and facial expression. Functional brain
imaging studies have shown that the frontal cortex of the brain is more active during tasks
involving social and emotional perception (Baron-Cohen et ah, 1994). Individuals with
frontal lobe lesions have been shown to have acquired difficulties in emotional and social
functioning similar to those in which social functioning deficits are frequently observed,
such as people with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1985). Difficulties in emotional perception has
also been found in individuals who have sustained a brain injury (Cicone et ah, 1980).
Additionally, acquired social perception deficits have been observed in stroke patients
(Happe et ah, 1999). Executive functioning is also seen as being mediated by the frontal
cortex (Dela Salla et ah, 1998). The aim of this present study was to investigate executive
function and social perception in post-stroke individuals.
The hypotheses were that stroke patients would show a reduced ability in social perception
compared to matched controls and that executive functioning would be positively associated
with social perception. Twenty-two individuals who had experienced a stroke were assessed
on tasks of executive function and compared to a control group on tasks of emotional
perception and social awareness.
The results were analysed within and between groups and are discussed with reference to
theories linking executive function and social perception with the frontal cortex. The
findings of this present study indicated no significant differences in the recognition of
emotion between individuals who have sustained lesions to the brain following stroke and
age-matched controls. Also, no significant differences were found on tasks of social
perception relative to controls. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the control
group may have performed at an unexpectedly low level. Significant and positive
associations were observed between executive function and both emotion recognition tasks
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A search for published research was undertaken using the following databases: PsychlNFO;
EMBASE; MEDLINE; and CINAHL. The key terms used included stroke, social perception,
social awareness, social comprehension, executive function and Theory of Mind. No
research was found that involved the three key areas of this thesis, i.e. stroke, social
perception and executive function. A literature search of published material in the areas of
neuropsychology, neurology, social psychology, neuropsychiatry and autistic spectrum
disorders, amongst others, was also carried out. From the literature, material germane to the
areas under investigation in this thesis was selected on the basis of relevance, significance or
contrast to a given topic.
This introduction describes neurological aspects of stroke and then discusses psychological
consequences of stroke on the individual. These include cognitive difficulties that may be
experienced following damage to the frontal regions of the brain and a discussion of
executive functioning with regard to emotional and social functioning. Also, descriptions of
particular emotional and behavioural difficulties experienced by those who have suffered a
stroke are discussed. The role of psychological competencies is discussed in the light of
recent research findings, specifically the recognition of emotion in others and social
awareness. Methodological issues surrounding the measurement of emotional recognition,
social awareness and functioning are then addressed, followed by a description of the aims
and hypotheses of the current study.
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1.1 Stroke
1.1.1 Definition of Stroke
The terms 'stroke' or cerebrovascular accident (CVA) refer to the effects of an interruption
to the blood supply of a localised area of the brain. This results in tissue damage and
consequent disruption of function in the brain and is usually caused by obstruction of a
cerebral blood vessel. Occlusion occurs in around 80% to 85% of individuals and in the
remaining 15% to 20% of cases stroke is due to rupture of a blood vessel (haemorrhage). A
wide range of disorders may be produced from pathology related to the blood vessels, which
in itselfmay take many forms. Robinson (1998) suggested a classification of cerebrovascular
disease based not on the aetiologies of underlying anatomical-pathological processes, which
would be many and complex, but rather by using the means by which these processes
manifest themselves.
Using this classification, cerebrovascular disease may be ordered into ischaemic disorders
and haemorrhagic disorders. Ischaemic disorder cases can result from a number of causes,
including the build up of fatty tissue on artery walls (thrombosis), a plug of thrombus
material that has broken away (embolism) and narrowed vessels from thickening or
hardening of the arteries (cerebral atherosclerosis). Ischemic disorder also includes transient
ischaemic attacks (TIAs). TIA refers to recurrent episodes of temporary focal ischaemia with
reversible neurological deficits and is linked to atherosclerotic thrombosis (Weinstein &
Swenson, 1998). TIAs commonly last between 5 and 20 minutes, though may have a
duration of seconds up to an accepted recovery period of 24 hours (Ross-Russell, 1983).
During such an attack, the individual experiences sudden loss of neurological function, such
as motor ability. This can often begin distally but may then progress to include the whole of
one limb or lateral motor functions of the body. TIAs do not cause stroke but act like a mini
stroke or indicator and may precede, occur with, or follow the development of a full stroke
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through cerebral or cerebellar artery occlusion. TIAs may occur in approximately one third
of sufferers with no apparent permanent disability, while in another third the individual will
go on to suffer a serious infarction.
The presence of TIAs suggest that a thrombotic process is occurring (Robinson, 1998).
Atherosclerotic thrombosis accounts for approximately one third of all strokes. This tends
not to be a uniform process but rather one in which particular areas of the arterial system are
affected more than others, particularly areas where arteries branch or bifurcate. Plaques
consisting of material such as cholesterol cause narrowing of the arteries and thereby restrict
the flow of blood to various regions of the brain. This may lead to the complete occlusion of
a given vessel. The effects of this type of cerebrovascular disease can range from very minor
to the catastrophic infarction of a large area of a particular hemisphere. Generally, the size of
the region affected will often depend on the size of the vessel occluded.
Thrombi forming in the heart are another a common cause of cerebral embolism, accounting
for a further third of cerebrovascular accidents. These result from a range of causes,
including cardiac arrhythmias, congenital heart disease and infectious processes. These
events tend to have a sudden onset with no prior warning. As with the pattern of
atherosclerotic thrombotic effects described above, a large embolus may occlude a major
vessel such as the internal carotid artery and cause a severe hemiplegia, or, if the embolus is
small, it may result in a transient neurological deficit. This in turn may resolve over time as
the embolus fragments and travels into smaller, more distal arteries with less obvious
neurological consequences. This also occurs in lacunar strokes, which account for between
15% and 20% of all strokes cases (Sacco, 1994). The effects of the occlusion of smaller,
penetrating cerebral arteries depend on the region involved. These emboli may result in
motor or sensory deficits, or show no recognisable neurological deficits. The strong
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association of both atherosclerosis and hypertension with lacunae suggests that lacunar
strokes may be a consequence of the atherosclerotic process extending into smaller arteries.
The fourth most frequent cause of stroke is due to intracranial haemorrhage producing
bleeding within the cranial cavity. This can be due to a number of events, including
intracerebral haemorrhage (ICH), associated with hypertension, or the rupture of
arteriovenous malformations (AVMs) or saccular aneurysms. Brain tissue is damaged by the
bleeding, which may be exacerbated by pressure effects. Neighbouring tissue may be
displaced or compressed should the bleeding continue. Such cerebrovascular events often
occur with little or no prior symptomotology and may be fatal in severe cases, particularly if
vital areas of the brain are affected. In many cases pressure may temporarily affect the
function of a particular area without actually damaging the brain tissue, thereby enabling
recovery of function over time.
In aneurysms and AVMs, rupture may produce intracerebral as well as subarachnoid
bleeding. The symptomotology may vary considerably depending on the extent of bleeding
and the areas and functions affected by the event. Ruptured aneurysms or AVMs of the pial
surface can cause subdural haematomas, which behave as space-occupying lesions and
produce many of the symptoms and behaviours of stroke.
Figures presented by Wade (1988) from a study of almost one thousand patients, show an
incidence of approximately two individuals in a thousand per year suggesting that stroke is
not an uncommon disease. This figure is likely to be an underestimate as their study only
considered individuals who presented at their GP's surgery and thus those who did not
present were not included in the estimate. The Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network
(2002), report that stroke is the third most common cause of death in Scotland and the most
frequent cause of severe adult disability. The number of individuals living with stroke and its
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consequences each year in Scotland is around 70,000, with approximately 15,000 new cases
estimated annually.
1.2 Consequences of Stroke
The consequences of stroke can vary significantly among individuals. This is due to the fact
that the definition of stroke does not specify damage to a particular cerebral blood supply,
area or degree of damage and does not take into account personal characteristics. In some
individuals there may be no apparent consequences from a cerebrovascular event, while in
others the degree of impairment may be catastrophic. Common consequences of stroke
include: hemiplegic limbs, communication difficulties, memory problems and perceptual
deficits. Wade, Langton-Hewer, Skilbeck & David (1985) suggest the following frequencies
of neurological deficits following stroke (Table 1):
TABLE 1.0: Neurological Deficits Following Stroke
Symptom
Depression of consciousness 30% - 40%
Loss ofmotor power 50% - 80%
Dysphasia 30%
Sensory disturbance 25%
An important factor in which functions may be affected by stroke is the area of the brain that
is affected. Other factors that may influence the consequence of stroke include the type and
severity of stroke experienced, and the gender and age of the individual (Sorgato, Colombo,
Scarpa & Faglioni, 1990). The influence of these factors will be discussed in more detail
below.
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1.2.1 Motor and Physiological
A very wide range of behaviours may be affected to a greater or lesser degree following a
stroke, depending on which part of the brain has been affected. There are general patterns of
behavioural and physiological functioning associated with different parts of the brain. For
example, the lowest area of the brain stem is involved in basic life-maintaining functions of
the central nervous system, such as respiratory control, blood pressure regulation and
heartbeat, and any damage to this part of the brain may result in death. Studies have revealed
a range of behaviours that can be induced when specific nuclei within the brainstem are
stimulated. These behaviours include chewing, sucking and swallowing (Jospeh, 1996).
These motor movements increase in complexity in relation to the distance from the basal
areas of the brainstem.
The cerebellum, in conjunction with the Pons, situated the top of the brain stem, regulates
postural and kinaesthetic movement. Recent studies of cerebellar activity also indicate its
involvement in other cognitive functions. The midbrain region is a small area forward of the
hindbrain and includes the major portion of the reticular activating system as well as motor
and sensory correlation centres. Lesions in this region of the brain have been found to result
in particular types of tremor and extraneous movement involving localised muscle groups, as
well as rigidity. The brainstem and areas of the midbrain are involved in vocalisations and
speech. Faulty articulation in speech, which may result from a brainstem, forebrain or
muscular lesion, are discussed further below. Damage to the thalamic areas would affect the
sensory correlation centres that are involved in communications between lower and higher
brain structures. Lesions in this area have been shown to affect body sensations, such as
tactile discrimination and the perception of pain. Apraxic difficulties are also not uncommon,
which can result in deficits of awareness of body parts and / or the position of the body in
space. Paralysis down one side of the body (hemiplegia) is a common consequence of stroke
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and may affect either the arm or leg or both of the contralateral side of the affected
hemisphere (King, 1990). As a stroke usually affects only one side of the brain, paraplegia
or quadriplegia is very rare.
1.2.2 Cognition
Cognitive impairments usually result from damage to the forebrain regions. This part of the
brain may be divided into the diencephalic structures, which include the thalamus, the
hypothalamus, and the cerebrum - the largest structures of the brain containing the left and
right hemispheres. As previously mentioned, damage to the thalamic regions of the brain
would affect the sensory correlation centres that are involved in communications between
lower and higher brain structures. The thalamus has also been shown to be involved in sleep
and arousal functions but particularly in memory function (e.g. as seen in Korsakoff
patients). Damage to this area of the brain can result in a dense verbal and visual anterograde
amnesia (Graff-Radford, Van Hoesen & Brandt, 1990; von Cramon, Hebel & Shuri, 1989).
There are a number of cognitive symptoms that are often thought of as being characteristic of
stroke, such as perceptual difficulties. A study by Diller and Winberg (1977) indicated a
prevalence of 40% left-side visual neglect following a right-sided stroke. Heir, Mondlock &
Caplan (1983) found a higher frequency of 85% in a study of 41 individuals who suffered a
stroke in the right hemisphere. Such patients will ignore stimuli in the left side of their visual
field. As previously mentioned, the type of stroke experienced can have an influence on the
consequences. A thrombotic stroke, for example, located in the internal carotid artery may
produce severe hemiplegia or if the blood flow of the middle cerebral artery (MCA) is
disrupted, the posterior frontal, temporal and parietal areas may be expected to be affected
due to their reliance on the MCA (Robinson, 1998).
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If the vertebrobasilar system is obstructed, then infarcts may be expected in the inferior
temporal or occipital lobes. Individuals with right hemisphere thrombotic strokes involving
the MCA have been reported to show more functional impairment than those who suffer left
hemisphere lesions (Kertesz, 1993). The more prevalent neuropsychological impairments,
therefore, centre around disrupted visuospatial abilities and gestalt-type concept formation,
which are more commonly functions of the right cerebral hemisphere (Lezak, 1995).
Individuals who experience a left-sided CVA would be expected to show more aphasic
difficulties. Thrombotic strokes involving the vertebrobasilar structure, such as an occlusion
of the posterior cerebral artery, which branches from this system, may result in impairments
of visual and memory functions. Around one third of obstructive strokes are due to cerebral
emboli (Robinson, 1998). In these cases the obstruction is caused by an embolus, a free
particle of fat or other tissue, that becomes lodged in a vessel thereby creating an occlusion.
The cerebral cortex is also involved in many of the behaviours and functions previously
outlined. The parietal lobes, for example, are involved in visual attention, touch perception
and the manipulation of objects. At a higher level, they also allow the integration of
information from different sources that enables an individual to form an understanding of a
single concept. Difficulties experienced following a stroke that has resulted in lesions in the
parietal lobes may include anomia, agraphia, alexia and dyscalculia.
Damage to the occipital lobes can result in a range of vision-related difficulties. These
include visual field deficits (difficulties in seeing objects in certain parts of the visual field),
difficulties identifying colours, visual hallucinations, as well as problems with reading and
writing. Visuo-perceptual difficulties are also related to damage of the temporal lobes, as are
hearing ability and memory acquisition (Kolb & Wishaw, 1990).
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Frontal lobe functioning, which is explored in more detail later, includes initiating
behaviours in response to stimuli in the environment, awareness of ourselves and others and
emotional regulation (Malloy, Cohen & Jenkins, 1998). Observed behavioural difficulties
following damage to this part of the cortex include emotional lability, loss of ability to
sequence complex motor movement, social interaction deficits and what has been termed
'personality changes'. Difficulty using expressive language may also be experienced with
lesions in this area, particularly around Broca's area which is involved in speech production
and processing rules of grammar. Other speech problems may be more dysarthric in nature,
usually a consequence of motor disturbances involving mouth and throat muscles. Such
speech and language problems are quite common following stroke, with around 25% of
stroke sufferers having aphasic difficulties and about a third having dysarthria (Wade, et al.,
1985; Brocklehurst, Andrews, Richards & Laycock, 1978). The severity and type of
cognitive impairments following stroke can vary significant among individuals and affect
processes central to social interaction and communication. These include language, visual
perception, attention and memory.
1.2.3 Emotion
Plutchik (1984) describes emotion as a reaction to an appropriate stimulus. Such a reaction
would include perception, expressive psychomotor behaviours and subjective experience.
Neuroanatomical and neurophysiological structures related to emotion have been identified
at different levels of the nervous system, including cortical, subcortical and limbic areas.
Damage to the thalamic regions of the brain can lead to a reduction in emotional capacity
and responsiveness, including a flat affect and apathy with loss of spontaneity and drive
(Butters & Stuss, 1989). However, Cummings & Mendez (1984) and Robinson, Boston,
Starkstein & Price (1988) reported transient manic episodes with right thalamic lesions.
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There are a number of manifestations of impairments in emotional functioning following
stroke. Stroke survivors may present with impaired emotional functioning because of a
lesion in an area that normally inhibits or mediates emotional reaction. Several studies have
examined the role of the right hemisphere in emotional processing. Researchers have
described the non-verbal and multi-dimensional aspects involved in conveying emotions,
such as facial expression and voice tone or quality (Joanette, Goulet & Hannequin, 1990;
Borod, 1998). The left hemisphere is normally viewed as dealing with content (i.e. words),
whereas individuals with right hemisphere damage have been shown to have an impaired
ability in identifying the features of emotionally-laden stimuli, in both auditory and visual
conditions (e.g. Borod & Koff, 1990). The different dimensions of emotional stimuli such as
facial expression, gestures and tone of voice appear to be processed by independent areas of
the brain and therefore can show deficits independently of each other.
Studies in which sodium amobarbital has been used to inactivate one hemisphere (Wada
technique) suggest that individuals can react to stimuli in different ways, either positively or
negatively depending on which hemisphere is disinhibited. Individuals whose left
hemisphere was inactivated were found to be more tearful and depressed than individuals
whose right hemisphere was inactivated. The mood of the latter group was found to be more
positive and they reported feelings of euphoria (Lee, Loring, Meador & Brooks, 1990;
Nebes, 1978). Some researchers have also suggested that emotional perception may be
influenced by ageing, perhaps showing a decline over time as occurs with cognitive
functions. However, a study of 90 normal adult females assigned to either a younger, middle-
aged or older group showed no overall changes in accuracy of the perception of emotion
across the different groups (Moreno, Borod, Welkowitz & Alpert, 1993).
Some researchers have questioned whether there are different rates of ageing between the
different cerebral hemispheres. Emotional perception is seen as being chiefly a function of
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the right hemisphere and may deteriorate if the right hemisphere was found to age more
quickly than the left. McDowell, Harrison & Demaree (1994) investigated the hemi-ageing
hypothesis but found little evidence to support the view of hemispheric ageing in relation to
emotional processing. However, findings from this study suggested that elderly subjects had
more difficulty processing negative affect, while their ability to process positive affect was
equal to that of younger subjects. A further study looking at the use of gestures as cues to
decoding emotion by younger and older adults found differences between the two groups
(Montepare, Koff, Zaithik & Albert, 1999). While both younger and older adults were found
to be able to accurately identify emotion, older adults made more overall errors, especially
when evaluating negative emotion. Another study suggests that the ability to recognise facial
affect demonstrates a progressive decline across the lifespan, particularly with regard to
anger (Brogole & Weisman, 1995).
The above research suggests there may a number of factors that influence emotional
functioning following stroke. These include the location of the lesion, and the form of the
emotional stimuli (e.g. auditory or visual). There is some further evidence that age may also
influence emotional functioning, particularly in the processing of negative emotions. Age
and hemispheric location of lesion, particularly those affecting the right hemisphere will be
discussed further in later sections.
1.2.4 Affect
Mental health issues, particularly anxiety and depression, are commonly experienced by
stroke survivors (Robinson, 1998). Symptoms associated with these conditions, such as
apathy, withdrawal and irritability, are likely to influence psychosocial behaviours. Robinson
(1998) describes depression as being one of the most frequent emotional disorders
experienced by stroke survivors that also has a significant impact on rehabilitation and
recovery. A community study looking at the prevalence of depression in post-stroke
17
survivors found 15% of 129 individuals showed major depression at 4 months following
stroke with 8% showing symptoms of dysthymia (Burvill, Johnson, Jamrozik, Anderson,
Stewart-Synne & Chakira, 1995). The prevalence of depression in hospitalised patients was
found to be similar to that of community samples, with 27% of 103 individuals meeting the
criteria outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders (3rd edition) for
major depression, while 20% were found to meet the criteria for dysthymic depression
(Robinson, Starr, Kubos & Price, 1983).
Astrom (1996), in a prospective study, examined the prevalence and course of general
anxiety disorder (GAD) and co-morbid depression in a population-based cohort of 80
individuals following acute stroke over a 3-year period. The prevalence of GAD was found
to be 28% in the acute stage with no significant reduction in the subsequent 36-month
period. This study also showed that in the acute stage GAD with co-morbid depression was
found to be associated with left hemisphere lesions, whereas anxiety alone was found to be
associated with right hemisphere damage. Robinson (1998) also reported a significantly
higher frequency of right hemisphere lesions in individuals with anxiety-alone disorders,
with a correspondingly significantly higher frequency of left hemisphere lesions in
individuals with depression (with or without co-morbid anxiety). These findings suggest that
anxiety and depression are associated with stroke and show that mental health issues are
commonly found in individuals who have suffered a stroke. Also, not least because of the
lengthy period of the conditions, they are very likely to impact on psychosocial functioning
of this group.
1.2.5 Gender and Age Differences
Age may have an influence on the type of stroke expected and the general associated
neuropsychological consequences. Embolic strokes, for example, are more commonly
associated with cardio-vascular disease, which tends to occur at an earlier age than strokes of
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a thrombotic nature (Lezak, 1995). Additionally, gender has been shown to be associated
with the areas of the brain in which lesions occur. More strokes involving the anterior
regions of the brain were found in female patients compared to men in a study by Damasio,
Tranel, Spradling & Allinger (1989), with associated differences in the nature of their
aphasic disorders.
1.2.6 Localisation and Recovery of Function
In addition to the cognitive disturbances that may be seen following a lesion in an area
involved in a specific function, electrophysiological studies and observation of post-stroke
patients suggest impairments can occur in areas of the brain relatively distant from the lesion
site. Such cognitive deficits may be seen as secondary diffuse effects as a result of oedema
and other physiological reactions. Stroke patients, therefore, often display signs of bilateral
or diffuse damage in the early post-stroke stages. Theories of the processes of cognitive
impairment following stroke reflect either behavioural or organic explanations. Techniques
developed to compensate for activities that are impaired following stroke, such as alternative
behavioural strategies, may be developed consciously or unconsciously by the individual and
are the focus of rehabilitation programmes designed to assist individuals overcome cognitive
and behavioural impairments.
At an organic level, improvement in cognitive function usually occurs as a result of the
receding effects of the depression of activity in areas outwith the immediate lesion site.
Other theories of recovery in cognitive functioning post-stroke have been forwarded
following evidence from animal studies suggesting the regeneration of axons - reactive
synaptogenesis or sprouting (e.g. Marciano, Green & Stachowiak, 1992). Other organically-
based theories of cognitive recovery are centred around observations of improvements seen
in young infants where some reorganisation of cerebral function may be seen. In such cases,
undamaged areas in a given hemisphere become significantly involved in functions usually
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seen as being under the control of the opposite hemisphere (Campbell, Bogen & Smith,
1981; Smith, 1984). More commonly, however, recovery of language function may be seen
in the first few months following a stroke. Language disturbances such as aphasia, for
example, usually resolve within four weeks if at all, and less than 25% of non-fluent patients
one month post-stroke are fluent at six months (Knopman, Seines, Niccum, 1983).
1.3 Executive Function
The frontal lobes of the brain play a significant role in behaviour and cognition. They have
found to be implicated in distinctive 'frontal' syndromes, particularly following damage to
the prefrontal, medial-frontal and orbitofrontal areas. Recent studies have described a
number of fronto-subcortical circuits linking areas of the frontal lobes to subcortical
structures within the brain. The frontal lobes mediate aspects of a number of cognitive
functions, including language, motor functions, attention and concentration, and executive
functions (Lezak, 1995). However, the true nature of the frontal lobes is a matter of
continued speculation due to the varied presentation and pattern of impairments following
lesions to this area of the cortex. Some individuals demonstrate quite pronounced deficits in
cognitive functioning and / or changes in their personality, which may present as socially
inappropriate or disinhibited behaviours (Joseph, 1996).
One of the first cases highlighting the effects of damage to the frontal lobes was that of
Phineas Gage (Harlow, 1868). This individual sustained damage following the violent
passage of an iron bar through the left frontal lobe, destroying much of this region of the
cortex, with the likelihood of sustaining damage to the right frontal region in the process.
From reports, Gage did not appear to have suffered significant cognitive damage inasmuch
as he continued to work and be self-reliant in the years following his injury. However, there
was a significant change in his personality from being an honest, reliable and apparently
'good businessman' pre-morbidly, to showing poor judgement, obstinacy, using profane
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language and being inconsiderate of others post-injury (Macmillan, 1986). Observations of
individuals who had sustained frontal lobe injury during the First World War enabled
clinicians to formulate a 'frontal lobe syndrome', in addition to identifying specific cognitive
impairments following damage to particular regions of the frontal cortex (Benton, 1991).
Following a review of the literature, Goldman-Rakic (1993), concluded that the frontal lobes
subserve a range of cognitive and behavioural functions, including, attention, reasoning and
planning, the utilisation of past experience in current situations, initiation, verbal and
constructional fluency, spatial orientation, inhibition, social affect and aspects of personality.
It can be seen, therefore, that the functions of the frontal lobes are both significant and
varied. Grafman, Sirigu, Spector & Hendler (1993) noted that impairments seen in
individuals who have suffered frontal lobe damage may also be seen in individuals with a
variety of sub-cortical neurological disorders. This suggests that the pre-frontal cortex may
not have a specific significance to given cognitive functions but are part of a widespread
neural network that incorporates the frontal lobes. This view, however, would much diminish
the concept of localisation of function, for which there is a substantial body of evidence.
Throughout the literature the terms 'frontal functioning' and 'executive functioning' are
frequently used interchangeably. However, a number of researchers point out that these are
not analogous terms. Support for this view comes from studies in which individuals who
display no behavioural features of frontal lobe damage, such as disinhibition, impulsivity, or
social inappropriateness, show poor performance on tests of frontal lobe functioning
(Anderson, Damasio, Jones & Tranel, 1991; Reitan & Wolfson, 1994). Additionally, there
are also individuals who present as frontally impaired who show no difficulty in their
performance of these tasks (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Brazzelli,
Colombo, Delia Sala & Spinnler, 1994). Phillips (1997) describes executive functioning as
the ' ...processes responsiblefor the control ofcognition and the regulation ofbehaviour and
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thought... [and] is critical in everyday life in order to initiate, monitor and terminate
behaviour patterns.' These processes are viewed primarily as being mediated by the pre¬
frontal cortex. A number of researchers have documented deficits in executive functioning
following damage to the frontal lobes in cases of neurological pathology, such as
cerebrovascular disease, as well as lesions following traumatic brain injury (e.g. Delia Sala,
Gray, Spinnler & Traveli, 1998).
Executive functioning is seen as being closely linked to a range of cognitive functions.
However, executive deficits appear to have a more global impact on a wide range of
behaviours while a number of cognitive abilities remain relatively intact (Lezak, 1995).
Thus, executive function may be viewed as having an influence greater than the sum of its
component parts. Deficits in executive functioning are often associated with personality
changes and are frequently reported by family members and those close to impaired
individuals. Increased impulsivity and deficits in motivation and the ability to plan, organise
and sequence actions are not uncommon (Malloy et ah, 1998). Such deficits often have a
severe negative impact on the individual's ability to self-care or engage in the activities of
everyday living. There is an over-reliance on previously used actions, with the individual
often becoming inflexible in both reasoning and in their patterns of behaviour. Difficulties in
problem-solving can result in anxiety, irritation and frustration if the individual is faced with
novel situations.
Altered psychosocial and emotional functioning following damage to the brain includes
disinhibited or socially inappropriate behaviours, impulsiveness, irritability and
misinterpretation of other's moods (Benton, 1991). The reported changes in personality,
psychosocial functioning and emotional functioning seen following many types of brain
damage reflect difficulties in a number of domains. Individuals with social and emotional
changes following lesions in the frontal regions of the brain have been shown to be severely
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impaired in emotion-related learning relative to individuals without injury in this area (Rolls,
Hornack, Wade & McGrath, 1994). This study also showed a highly significant correlation
between impaired emotional learning and disinhibited and socially inappropriate behaviour
exhibited in individuals with lesions in the frontal cortex. These findings support the view
that executive functioning and emotional functioning are correlated and individuals who
demonstrate impairments in one domain also exhibit deficits in the other. An examination of
executive functioning following a cerebrovascular event will be discussed below.
A number of neuropsychological tests are commonly used to assess executive functioning.
Among the more common are the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) (Heaton, 1981) and
tests of verbal fluency, such the FAS test (Benton, 1968), with of evidence to suggest that
impaired performance on such tests reflect deficits observed with executive disorders
(Lezak, 1995). However, in a critical review of the literature examining the usefulness of
both the WCST and measures of verbal fluency, Reitan and Wolfson (1994) urge caution in
their use. Their conclusions suggest that while both these measures are sensitive to damage
to frontal lobe functions, they are not capable of exclusivity in doing so but are also
susceptible to lesions in other areas of the brain, thus raising issues of sensitivity and
specificity.
1.3.1 Executive Function and Stroke
As previously indicated, intact executive functioning is critical in everyday life in order to
initiate, monitor and terminate behaviour patterns (Phillips, 1997). Lezak (1995)
conceptualises executive functioning as comprising of four main components: volition;
planning; purposeful action; and effective performance. These functions are seen as
necessary for appropriate, activity-related behaviours and impairments in these areas may be
observed in post-stroke patients (Robinson, 1998). In addition to these deficits, there are also
psychosocial impairments associated with damage to the frontal lobes, particularly in
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relation to the recognition of emotional expression. For example, impairments in identifying
facial and emotional expression have been shown in individuals who exhibit socially
inappropriate behaviours (Hornak, Rolls & Wade, 1996). These deficits form part of the
presentation of changes in cognitive and intellectual functioning and personality which may
be seen in individuals who had suffered a cerebrovascular event, particularly involving the
anterior regions of the cerebral cortex. Overall, problems in executive functioning and
psychosocial functioning are likely to contribute to the difficulties experienced by a number
of stroke patients.
The consequences of impaired frontal lobe functioning are multi-faceted and can include
perseverative behaviours, decreased working memory, reduced temporal memory, and
inefficient learning, which may also be exacerbated by impulsivity and emotional lability
(Malloy et al., 1998). The link between executive functioning and the frontal lobes may have
implications for developing or maintaining relationships as individuals with frontal lesions
have been shown to experience a deterioration in psychosocial functioning (Lezak &
O'Brien, 1990). This in turn may have negative consequences for the well-being of the
individual. There is considerable literature describing the range of affective disorders often
experienced following stroke (e.g. Robinson, 1998). Bogonsslavsky (2003) outlined the
importance for professionals of recognising alterations in emotional functioning and
behaviour post-stroke because of the impact of these changes on the affective state of the
individual and the high incidence of depression in this group (see Robinson, 1998).
Additionally, neuropsychological impairments, including deficits in executive functioning is
likely to have an impact on the rehabilitation of stroke survivors. In a review of the literature
looking at predictors associated with poor outcome, cognitive and behavioural difficulties




The concept of social functioning can be defined in a number of ways. Here it is used to
mean the competencies an individual possesses that enable him or her to interact
appropriately with others in a range of situations. Social competence has been described by
McFall (1982) as the effectiveness of an individual's performance on a given task, where the
individual's skills are used to gauge competence. They subsequently defined social skills as
the component processes that allow an individual to behave in a competent manner. Social
skills and social competencies are fields that have attracted a large amount of research and
cannot be fully explored within the constraints of this present study. Therefore, the two
elements of effective social competence that will be focussed upon here are the recognition
of emotion and social awareness. The latter is a complex concept that involves a range of
abilities involving both self-awareness and an awareness of others. The perception, needs
and beliefs of others are issues that have been investigated extensively in studies involving
Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). Theory of Mind can be defined as the
ability to ascribe independent mental states to both oneself and others in order to explain and
predict behaviour. Independent states of mind involve the desires, beliefs, intentions and
feelings held by an individual. This research has focused on the skills involved in
interpersonal behaviours and has important implications for successful social functioning.
1.4.1 Theory ofMind
The term Theory of Mind (ToM) was first used by Premack & Woodruff (1978) in their
studies of non-human primates and subsequently adopted by Baron-Cohen and colleagues as
an explanation for the psychosocial deficits frequently observed in autistic individuals
(Baron-Cohen et ah, 1985). This view suggests that the developmental process that normally
occurs around four years of age, whereby children learn that other people hold beliefs and
desires independently, either fails to develop or is in some way impaired in autism. This
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view suggests that such individuals are specifically impaired in a number of social,
communicative and imaginative skills. ToM, therefore, may be considered a cognitive
mechanism enabling the ability to view the world from another's standpoint (or 'mind-
read'). Baron-Cohen et al., (1985), explored this hypothesis on twenty autistic children with
mental ages well above four years of age using a false belief task (a scenario in which the
child's own belief is different to that of one of the characters involved). Fourteen children
with Down's syndrome who all had a mental age lower than four years were also tested. Of
the twenty autistic children, only four passed the task, whereas all but two of the Down's
syndrome group passed. ToM abilities appear to be independent of other cognitive functions,
as many autistic children have been shown to perform poorly on such tasks yet show average
or above average intelligence (Happe, 1994).
Functional brain imaging studies have shown that the frontal regions of the brain are more
active during ToM tasks that during control tasks. A single photon emission computerised
tomography (SPECT) study testing twelve normal adult male subjects (age 20-24 years)
indicated significant activation of the right orbito-frontal cortex (Baron-Cohen, Ring,
Moriarty, Schmidt, Costa & Ell, 1994). The ToM hypothesis postulates that there is a
developmental deficit in ToM abilities in autism, but similarities have been noted between
the behaviour of autistic children and adults who have suffered damage to the frontal lobes
(Damasio & Maurer, 1978). A number of studies have provided some evidence that such a
deficit may result following trauma to the brain. Happe et al., (1999) investigated this
hypothesis in a group of nineteen individuals (10 males and 9 females, mean age 64 years)
who had sustained lesions to the right hemisphere following a stroke on a range of ToM-
related and control materials. A control group of nineteen healthy individuals (10 males and
9 females, mean age 73) were also tested. Happe and her colleagues found the stroke
survivors to be significantly worse in their attribution of mental states and this deficit was
not shown to be a function of task difficulty. A related study on five left-hemisphere stroke
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patients (4 males and 1 female, mean age 67 years) revealed no difficulty in mental state
attribution in this group (Happe, Brownell & Winner, 1999).
These findings suggest that psychosocial difficulties seen in individuals with right
hemisphere damage may be due to an acquired impairment in ToM abilities. There are,
however, important methodological considerations in Happe's study that should be
highlighted. The number of participants in each of the groups was low, therefore, factors
such as gender and age could not be investigated. There was also a considerable range in
time since event (e.g. from 12 months to 21 years post-stroke) and the pre-morbid ability of
the participants was not fully explored. Additionally, language and communication
difficulties are more common in individuals who have sustained damage to the left
hemisphere and all the participants in this study with left hemisphere damage had expressive
dysphasia. The task materials were modified to accommodate these difficulties, which may
well have influenced the results. These studies do indicate that some individuals appear to
sustain impaired psychosocial functioning following damage to the brain, but do not clearly
identify the source as being located in the right hemisphere.
Impaired ToM abilities have also been found following frontal lobe surgery, where pre¬
morbid ToM functioning was documented (Happe, Malhi & Checkley, 2001). Evidence of
impaired ability to understand subtle emotional and social cues have also been found
following traumatic brain damage. An individual with relatively preserved frontal lobe
functioning was found to be impaired on tasks that required the interpretation of social skills,
which reflected her day-to-day functioning (Cicerone & Tanenbaum, 1997). While some of
these studies involve single case studies, there is considerable evidence of poor psychosocial
functioning being a common sequelae of acquired brain injury (e.g. Ownsworth, McFarland
& Young, 2000). Overall, the evidence suggests that impairment in ToM abilities may be
acquired following lesions to the brain, particularly the frontal regions of the brain. Social
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interaction difficulties seen in autistic individuals with impaired ToM may well be reflected
in adults who have suffered a stroke.
ToM deficits may be correlated with executive functioning due to the involvement of the
frontal lobes. Individuals with frontal lobe injury can show reduced social abilities through,
for example, impaired self-regulation and reduced insight, and experience deterioration in
social relationships or social isolation as a consequence (Lezak & O'Brien, 1990).
Indifference regarding the well-being of others, an ego-centric attitude, loss of warmth and
lack of empathy are alterations in emotional and social behaviours that others find difficult to
accept (Wood, 2001). Such changes in emotional behaviour have been reported following
lesion in the frontal areas of the brain (Danrasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1990). It may be
hypothesised, therefore, that damage to the frontal lobes can result in a reduced ability to
understand the mental states of others. The consequence of this would be poor social
functioning.
1.4.2 Recognition of Emotion
Research has shown that some individuals have difficulty in the perception of affect through
facial expression following damage to the brain. Identification and discrimination abilities in
face perception is found to be impaired in some individuals following brain lesion,
particularly when the lesion is located in the right posterior area of the brain (Hamsher,
Levin & Benton, 1979; Benton, 1980). A number of other studies have indicated that deficits
in the perception of facial affect or emotion may also be a consequence of lesions in the right
cerebral hemisphere (e.g. Cicone, Wapner & Gardner, 1980). This study investigated thirty-
nine patients with unilateral brain injury, of which twenty-one had right hemisphere lesions
(mean age 49) and eighteen had left hemisphere lesions (mean age 58). Two groups of
controls matched to the brain injured groups in terms of age, socio-economic status and
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education levels were also assessed. The first control group were ten in-patients recruited
from non-neurological wards and thirteen individuals who had received bi-frontal
leucotomies approximately 15 years earlier as a treatment for schizophrenia. The materials
used included a range of emotion-related materials in different modalities (e.g.
visual/pictorial; aural/verbal). The results revealed that both the right-hemisphere and frontal
patients exhibited difficulties in facial recognition with the right-hemisphere group
demonstrating reduced abilities in all modalities. Methodological considerations, however,
include a lack of specific lesion location in some individuals, with quite extensive damage
being recorded in others. Additionally, the inclusion of individuals as controls with
significant mental health conditions who had also received psychosurgery is questionable
and likely to introduce a number of confounding variables.
In a study looking at the effect of posterior and frontal lesions upon the ability to recall facial
emotion, individuals with frontal lesions were found to be impaired in relation to controls
(Prigatano & Pribram, 1982). The effects of damage to the frontal lobes were also examined
by Hornak et al. (1996), in which twenty-three individuals who suffered injury to the brain
either as a result of stroke or head injury were tested on voice and facial expression
identification. Participants were either in-patients or out-patients of a rehabilitation centre.
Although the time since event was not recorded, the results indicated that separate domains
may exist for the different components of the tasks given, with individuals who had
sustained injury to the ventral frontal area of the brain showing impairments in the
identification of voice and facial expression, though not necessarily occurring in the same
individual. Reduced performance in expression tasks was found to correlate with changes in
the degree of subjective emotional experience reported by the individual. Of the 12
individuals with ventral-frontal damage, one showed impairment in identifying vocal
expression in others with the other 11 demonstrating severe impairment. Only four of the 11
non-ventral group showed an impaired performance. In the identification of facial
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expressions condition, nine of the twelve ventral group were severely impaired, whereas in
the non-ventral group only one was impaired and one severely impaired. The authors suggest
that these difficulties may contribute to the altered behaviour and reduced psychosocial
functioning seen following brain lesions.
Age may also influence the identification of facial emotion among individuals who have
suffered a stroke or a brain injury but this has not been specifically investigated in the studies
outlines above. However, a study examining the perception of facial emotion across the
lifespan in 90 normal adult females assigned to three separate groups (30 aged 21-39 years;
30 aged 40-59 years; and 30 aged 60- 81), found no changes in the accuracy of perception as
a function of age (Moreno et al., 1993). However, such single-sex studies may not be
generalisable as evidence from a number of studies have suggested a reduced ability in the
perception of emotion in older adults, particularly in relation to negative emotions
(McDowell et ah, 1994; Montepare et ah, 1999; Brogole & Weisman, 1995).
1.4.3 Social Cognition
The skills involved in social cognition include insight into one's own thoughts and
behaviours as well as an awareness of the beliefs and intentions of others. Impaired social
cognition and self-regulation skills are common sequelae of brain injury and are associated
with poor psychosocial functioning (Morton & Wehman, 1995). These difficulties can lead
to decreased social contact, disrupted interpersonal relationships and employment
difficulties. As previously outlined above, anxiety and depression are commonly experienced
in stroke survivors with concomitant symptoms such as apathy and irritability likely to
influence psychosocial behaviours.
A study investigating models of social cognition in a group of 40 adults (32 males, 8
females; mean age 32 years) who had sustained a closed head injury (CHI) included an
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assessment of interpersonal strategies employed in social problem-solving scenarios in
which an element of conflict was evident (Levine, Van Horn & Curtis, 1993). The results
showed that compared to a control group of 26 healthy adults (11 males, 15 females; mean
age 34 years), the head injury group consistently used a strategy indicating they typically
took into account the perspective of only one individual in the given vignettes. The control
group, however, utilised a reciprocal strategy by alternating their view of the scenario from
the perspective of each individual involved.
The authors concluded that the responses of the CHI group were significantly more concrete
and individually less socially mature than those of the controls. The types of injury
sustained, however, indicate that 31 of the 40 individuals in the CHI group had been
involved in motor vehicle accidents (eight had been pedestrians), five had sustained a
previous head injury, and 17 abused alcohol. The findings of this study may, however,
reflect some pre-morbid personality characteristics of the participants. There may be other
characteristics of this group with which alcohol abuse and predisposition to involvement in
accidents are associated that also cause individuals to show social interaction difficulties. But
there is insufficient information on which to draw any conclusions. The CHI group also
revealed a primary concern regarding changes in their physical, active and social
characteristics while their perceptions of their personality had remained unchanged relative
to their current perceptions of self prior to their injury. These results of immature levels of
social cognition following head injury support previous findings from a related study that
showed levels of social cognition in a group of ten brain injured adults (6 males, 4 females;
mean age 37 years) which were comparable to those exhibited in a sample of non-clinical
adolescents (Van Horn, Levine & Curtis, 1992).
The social interaction deficits outlined above are also seen in the interpersonal difficulties
associated with autism. In a review of the research on the social impairments in autism,
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Travis & Sigman (1998) concluded these deficits might result from the impaired ability to
take account of others' perspectives. What had been described as tactless behaviour and the
disregard of social norms and conventions can be viewed as impaired social cognition. The
case of Phineas Gage (Harlow, 1868) previously discussed, might also be seen as an
acquired deficit in social cognition following injury to the brain. There is some evidence to
suggest, therefore, that individuals who have sustained injury to the brain following stroke,
particularly those who have acquired lesions in the frontal areas of the brain will show
impairments in social cognition, thus impacting on social functioning. These issues will be
explored in more detail in the following sections.
1.5 Stroke and Social Functioning
1.5.1 Emotion Recognition Following Stroke
Studies have shown that individuals who have sustained a brain injury demonstrate
impairment in recognising emotion in others that may not be accounted for by deficits in
visuo-perceptual abilities per se (Bowers, Bauer, Coslett & Heilman, 1985). This has been
observed with lesions in the right posterior hemisphere and with damage to the frontal lobes
(Cicone et al., 1980; Hornak et ah, 1996). Individuals who have sustained brain lesions as a
consequence of stroke have also shown difficulties in the perception of emotion across
facial, prosodic and lexical channels (Borod, 1998). There are a number of studies that
suggest mechanisms which may be involved in the comprehension of emotion (e.g. Heilman,
Bowers Speedie & Coslett, 1984).
Comprehension of verbal emotional communication depends on at least two factors: the
prepositional word message and the emotional prosodic message, which may be either
congruent or incongruent. An example of the latter may be sarcasm, where the important
component may be how a message is conveyed as opposed to what is being said. Bowers,
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Coslett, Bauer, Speedie & Heilman (1987) presented emotionally intoned sentences with
both congruent and incongruent content to 16 individuals with right hemisphere damage
(RHD), 15 left hemisphere damage (LHD) and 14 individuals with no neurological
impairments (NNI). The results of this study indicated that RHD individuals were poorer
overall on comprehension of the emotional message being conveyed and this was found to
be more so when the prepositional word content was incongruent. Additionally,
comprehension of the prepositional message was more disrupted for left-hemisphere
damaged individuals when the emotional prosody was incongruent. These findings suggest
that individuals with RHD have difficulty comprehending information through prosodic
communication.
Bowers, Blonder, Feinberg & Heilman, (1991) investigated thirty-six individuals with either
unilateral hemispheric lesions involving the right and left hemisphere or who had no
neurological damage on two tasks of visual imagery: one involving imagery for facial
emotions and the other involving imagery for common objects. The results indicated that
individuals who had sustained damage to the right hemisphere were more impaired on the
emotional task than the object task, whereas the opposite was found in individuals who had
sustained damage to the left hemisphere. Following individual case analyses, the authors
suggest some of the right-hemisphere damage individuals displayed a facial affect agnosia
and showed impairment on emotional imagery and emotional perceptual tasks. Bowers and
colleagues postulate that these findings support the hypothesis that the right hemisphere may
contain what they describe as a 'lexicon' of facial emotions.
Borod, Rorie, Pick, Bloom, Andelman, Campbell et al., (2000), among others, investigated
the ability to use words to convey emotion in a study of emotional and non-emotional
discourse production in individuals with brain damage and in controls. Their findings
indicated that left-hemisphere damaged individuals were particularly impaired in the non-
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emotional condition, whereas right-hemisphere damaged individuals were found to be more
impaired in the emotional condition. The findings described above suggest an important role
for the right hemisphere in emotion and that damage sustained to the right hemisphere may
impair the perception, comprehension and production of emotion-related communication.
The role of the right hemisphere in the ability to successfully process emotion-related stimuli
will be briefly outlined in the following section.
1.5.2 Emotional Processing and the Right Hemisphere
Two major hypotheses have been put forward to explain the relationship between the right
cerebral hemisphere and emotion and have been described as the right-hemisphere
hypothesis and the valence hypothesis (Borod, 1992; Liotti & Tucker, 1995). The right-
hemisphere hypothesis proposes that for the expression and perception of emotion,
regardless of pleasantness (i.e. valence), the right hemisphere is dominant over the left
hemisphere. The valence hypothesis, on the other hand, states that the right hemisphere is
dominant for negative or unpleasant emotions with the left hemisphere dominant for positive
or pleasant emotions. Borod (1998) investigated these hypotheses in a study looking at the
perception and discrimination of different emotions across 3 communication channels: facial,
prosodic and lexical. Participants in the study included 11 post-stroke individuals with right
hemisphere damage and 10 individuals with left hemisphere damage, along with 15 matched
controls. The results of this study suggest support for the right-hemisphere hypothesis in the
perception of emotional stimuli across all communication channels.
However, on discrimination tasks where pairs of emotion-related stimuli were presented that
displayed either the same or different emotions, no differences between the groups were
found. Additionally, when group performance was examined on positive and negative items
for each communication channel no group difference as a function of valence was found.
However, a criticism of the study may stem from the demands of the procedures involved as
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this necessitated the inclusion of brain-injured participants who showed only relatively mild
cognitive and linguistic impairments, which may have influenced the results. Zgaljardic,
Borod & Sliwinski, (2002), in a follow-up study looking at recovery of emotional processing
using the paradigm outlined above, found evidence of recovery on emotional perception
tasks but with individuals who had suffered right hemisphere damage continuing to perform
poorer than both controls and individuals who had suffered left hemisphere damage.
1.5.3 Social Functioning and Executive Functioning
Despite making a good physical recovery following a stroke, a number of stroke survivors
demonstrate poor psychosocial functioning, which may not be explained by psychological or
physical impairments. Clark and Smith (1999) looked at psychological correlates of outcome
in a sample of sixty individuals twelve-months post-stroke who had undergone a
rehabilitation programme and were subsequently living in a family environment. They found
abnormal illness behaviour to be important in determining functional disability, with
depression associated with reduced social functioning. Importantly, family functioning was
seen as a key feature of social activity. Interpersonal functioning is mediated to some extent
by emotion, with reduced interpersonal functioning associated with low mood. As previously
discussed (see section 4.3.5), mood disorder has been put forward as a consequence of
neurological damage, generally to the right hemisphere with regard to anxiety and to the left
hemisphere with regard to depression (Astrom, 1996; Robinson, 1998).
There is, however, continued debate as to specific neurological lesion sites and the
consequences for interpersonal functioning. Robinson & Szetela (1981) compared 18
individuals with left hemisphere damage following stroke with 11 individuals who had
sustained left hemisphere damage lesions following traumatic brain injury (TBI). Both
groups were found to be comparable on a number of measures including neurological
symptoms and cognitive impairment. However, only 20% of the TBI group showed
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clinically significant depression compared with more than 60% of the stroke group. It was
noted that although the lesions of both groups were of similar size, the locations of lesion
within the hemisphere were different. Further analysis of 7 members of each of the groups
matched for location of lesion revealed no significant difference in the frequency of
depression, with the stroke group showing similar frequency rates to that of the TBI group.
While it is acknowledged that the number of participants in each of the groups was small,
these findings suggest that the higher rate of depression found initially was influenced by
lesions in the anterior region of the left hemisphere.
However, the frontal lobes of the brain have also been implicated in mood disturbance
following lesions in this area. Robinson (1998) proposes a mechanism by which the frontal
lobes are involved in both primary and post-stroke depression based on evidence from a
number of studies using imaging and bio-chemical techniques (e.g. Bench, Friston, Brown,
Scott, Frackowiak & Dolan, 1992). Robinson postulates damage to lateralised bio-chemical
pathways contained in the frontal regions of the brain can cause mood disorder, particularly
with left frontal lesions. These findings suggest organic changes following brain lesions can
result in mood changes, which may have negative consequences for social functioning.
There is also some evidence, however, that mood disorder may result from the consequences
of neuropsychological impairments experienced following stroke. A number of aspects of
psychosocial functioning are mediated by executive function, such as the regulation of one's
behaviour and thoughts, motivation and volition (Phillips, 1997; Lezak, 1995), and damage
to the frontal areas of the brain may result in deficits in these abilities. Additionally,
disinhibited and sexually inappropriate behaviours seen in some individuals with frontal
lesions may cause such individuals to be left socially isolated (Lezak & O'Brien, 1990).
These finding suggest poor social functioning concomitant with executive function deficits.
However, there is an absence of research of the factors involved in appropriate social
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interaction that are thought to be mediate by the executive functions, such as the need to take
account of the needs and wishes of others, self-awareness and the ability to monitor and alter
one's behaviour. Approaches to assessing the different components of social perception will
be discussed in the following sections.
1.6 Measuring Emotion Recognition
It has been shown that normal individuals are capable of discriminating between six different
types of facial expression that include happy, sad, surprised, angry, afraid and disgusted
(though descriptions alter with anxious being used instead of afraid and revolted in place of
disgusted, for example) and that this is a cross-cultural ability, which transcends linguistic
barriers (Kolb & Wishaw, 1990). The ability to recognise emotions has been measured using
a range of different techniques and formats. Often these have involved the capacity to
discern a target emotion from a 2-dimensional emotion-related stimulus usually containing a
face but varying in form from a photograph or cartoon showing, for example, full face views,
profdes or split-half composites (e.g. Stone, Nisenson, Eliassen, Gazzaniga, 1996;
Nakamura, Kawashima, Ito, Sugiura, Kato, Nakamura et al., 1999; Critchley, Daly, Phillips,
Brammer, Bullmore, Williams et ah, 2000). Alternatively, participants have been asked to
discriminate between stimuli or to match appropriate emotions from a given range (e.g.
Borod, 1998; Kolb & Taylor, 1988).
For example, Kolb & Taylor (1988) conducted a series of studies involving individuals who
had sustained brain lesions and their subsequent ability to recognise emotions. In these
studies participants were requested to match facial photographs according to the emotion
inferred from the facial expression each portrayed. Cicone et ah, (1980) studied the ability to
perceive emotions in others by asking individuals to match cartoons based on the emotion-
related scenes portrayed in each. Both of these studies used visual stimuli in their non-verbal
conditions and both showed right hemisphere impairment in the visual form. An example of
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using verbal stimuli to measure emotion recognition can be seen in the verbal condition of
the study by Cicone et al., (1980). In this condition, the emotion-related scenes were either
described verbally or provided in a written format. The results pertaining to this aspect of the
study showed that right hemisphere-damaged individuals were as equally impaired as left
hemisphere-damaged individuals. This was taken as evidence supporting the view that the
right hemisphere is dominant in comprehending emotional stimuli and is secondary to
language deficits in individuals who sustain lesions to the left hemisphere. However, from
measurement perspective, the importance of both visual and verbal aspects of emotional
understanding is outlined below.
The verbal and vocal components of emotional communication have been studied by a
number of researchers, with the use of auditory stimuli commonly being used in laterality
studies. This can be seen in a study by Ley & Bryden (1982) in which the dissociation in
hemispheric differences in recognising emotional tone and content of verbally presented
stimuli is investigated. In this study, short sentences spoken in happy, sad, neutral and angry
voices were presented dichotically-paired with neutral sentences of similar semantic content.
The results indicated a strong left-ear advantage for identifying the emotional tone of voice
and a right-ear advantage in identifying the content of the sentence. More recent studies have
measured emotion recognition and its different components, such as perception, arousal and
subjective experience, across different forms of communication (e.g. Borod, 1998). For
example, information may be communicated through facial expression, verbal, lexical,
gestural and postural means.
A number of assessment batteries have been developed that measure emotional perception
across different modes, such as the Perception of Emotion Test (Egan et al., 1990). This is a
test of facial, prosodic and verbal perception involving 128 six-second audio-visual tape
segments. Four emotions are examined in this battery - anger, happiness, neutrality and
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sadness - in four conditions: emotion-related scripts verbally presented in a neutral tone of
voice without a video element; prosodically-intoned scripts with no emotion-related content
verbally presented with no video; facial expressions presented on video with no sound; and
combined video clips with sound and emotion-related content. Following viewing of the
stimulus, each participant has a short time in which to respond by pointing to one of four
drawings, each with a verbal label identifying the emotion the drawing represents. This test
was initially administered to 100 healthy adults (mean age = 22.2 years), 11 left hemisphere
injured individuals (mean age = 65.9 years) and 10 individuals who had sustained damage to
the right hemisphere (mean age = 63.6 years) (Egan et al., 1990). This test combines a
number of the different components involved in measuring emotion recognition and the
inclusion of real-time video presentation of emotion-related stimuli across different
communication channels (facial and vocal expression, verbal content and gestural and
postural information) provides a degree of ecological validity (Borod, Andelman, Obler,
Tweedy & Welkowitz, 1992).
Clearly a range of techniques has been developed to assess emotion recognition. These range
from single component, uni-modal studies to multi-component, multi-modal studies. The
latter approach has been viewed as having greater ecological validity, given that real-life
situations generally involve this form of communication between individuals. This
advantage, provided by the use of video material over the more static measures previously
described is available with The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) (McDonald,
Flanagan & Rollins, 2002), which was used in the present study.
1.7 Measuring Social Awareness
The measurement of social awareness is often part of Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985). In these studies researchers are investigating the ability to ascribe
independent mental states to oneself and to others, a deficit commonly found in autism or
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autistic spectrum disorders (Wing, 1988). As previously outlined in section 4.3.1, these states
involve desires, beliefs, intentions and feelings and low scores on such tasks are cited as
evidence of deficits in psychosocial functioning. Wing & Gould (1979) proposed a Triad of
Impairments in autism: deficits in social communication and imaginative skills, along with
inflexibility in thinking and behaviour. A significant degree of the research that has been
carried out to investigate this phenomenon has focused on children and adolescents and has
tended to use actual materials as visual prompts (e.g. The Smarties Task, Pemer, Frith, Leslie
& Leekham, 1989), social scenarios in which dolls are used to represent people (e.g. The
Sally-Anne Task, Baron-Cohen, 1989) or printed stories or cartoon scenes containing
emotion-related material or a social dilemma (e.g. Strange Stories, Happe, 1994).
The strange stories developed by Happe (1994) are used to assess the individual's ability to
understand the behaviour of others in various social situations. The stories describe various
scenarios in which a character lies for a particular reason, such as to avoid trouble, humour,
to avoid hurting another's feelings, persuasion or sarcasm. The participant would be required
to say whether what the character had said was factually true and what his or her justification
was for saying it. From this information it is possible to gauge whether the participant can
comprehend the thoughts, feelings and beliefs of others.
This format has also been used with adults, specifically in studies involving acquired TOM
deficits in adults (see section 4.4.1) Happe et al., (1999), investigating acquired deficit in
ToM in individuals who had sustained lesions to the right hemisphere following a stroke,
used a similar range of social stories adapted from the author's original material. In this
particular study, sixteen short passages of two types were developed: ToM stories
concerning double-bluff, persuasion, mistakes and white lies; and non-mental state stories.
The participants were required to make inferences about the characters' thoughts and
feelings and also make an inference about the intentions of the speaker in the story. A second
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part of the study used 12 single-frame humorous cartoons taken from popular magazines.
These made up two conditions: ToM cartoons in which the humour depended on what the
character mistakenly thought or did not know; and non-mental state cartoons in which the
humour depended on a physical anomaly or violation of a social norm.
The study by Levine et al., (1993), previously discussed in section 1.4.3, investigating
models of social cognition included an investigation into the use of interpersonal strategies
employed in social problem-solving scenarios in which an element of conflict was
incorporated. The social vignettes used in this study were provided verbally, while each
participant was given a printed copy of the story to follow. Stories were again used in the
study by Happe et al. (2001), which looked at acquired ToM deficits following frontal lobe
surgery. In this study each story was given to the participant who was instructed to read it
silently until they felt they had understood the content. Similarly, a study by Bach, Happe,
Fleminger & Powell (2000) used a comparable method of testing social perception through
the use of written stories and printed cartoons. It is evident that little use has been made of
other mediums or of other forms communication, although emotion-related vocalisations
have been used (e.g. Hobson, Ouston & Lee, 1988).
In this study, the participants were a group of 21 adolescents and young adults (mean age
18.09 years) who had been given a diagnosis of autism and a group of 21 matched controls
(mean age = 18.05 years) (Hobson et al., 1988). The participants were asked to listen to a
series of six successive 10-second audiotaped sounds, after which they were required to
choose a photograph from an array which they felt most corresponded with the sound. They
recordings were of emotionally expressive vocalisations: happy humming; sad sighs and
groans; gasps and high-pitched tones of fear; angry snorts and growling sounds; light, high-
pitched sounds of surprise; and 'ughh' sounds of disgust. The findings suggest that autistic
individuals show impairments in recognising emotion-related vocalisations. Speech has
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significant influence on social perception and communication and a considerable degree of
research has been carried out on, for example, the effect of vocal pitch, loudness, enunciation
and intonation (Collier, 1985). However, little research exists in the measuring social
perception using vocal materials.
Sarcasm has been used as one of the reasons an individual may 'lie' in a social situation
(Happe, 1994). Understanding subtle (and sometimes heavy) emotional and social
communication in the form of sarcasm has been shown to be impaired in individuals with
poor social perceptual abilities. This form of verbal communication depends on what is said
and how it is communicated. Comprehension of emotion-related messages has been found to
be impaired in brain injured individuals when incongruence exists between the message and
intonation (Bowers et al., 1987). Additionally, the study by Montepare et ah, (1999),
previously described in section 1.2.3, found the ability to use paralinguistic cues such as
gestures and body movements to be lower in older adults (mean age = 76.5 years) relative to
younger adults (mean age = 18.7 years) in identifying emotion.
The studies outlined above have used a number of methods to measure social perception.
However, there is a range of elements involved in accurate perception in social situations.
The measure used in this present study (The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT),
McDonald, et ah, 2002) involves the use of video segments, in both the recognition of
emotion component as well as in the social inference component, in which facial expression,
vocal intonation, body posture and gestures, among other cues, are available. Additionally, in
the social inference component of the TASIT, participants are required to infer from video
material the speaker's intention, attitude and meaning. This is in essence what is sought from
participants in the ToM tasks outlined above.
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1.8 Summary
Stroke is a neurological condition that is relatively common in the general population. For
many individuals there are a number of neuropsychological sequelae that affect a range of
cognitive and behavioural functions. While cognitive functioning is most influenced by the
location and severity of the lesion, other factors influencing the consequences of a stroke
include the age and gender of the individual (Sorgato et al., 1990). The frontal lobes of the
brain particularly are involved in a wide range of cognitive functions, including attention,
concentration, motor sequencing and executive functions (Goldman-Rakic, 1993). Executive
function also mediates initiation and response to environmental stimuli, awareness of the self
and others, emotional regulation and social interaction. Because of neurological inter-
connectedness, damage to cortical and sub-cortical areas distal to the frontal regions may
result in deficits in frontal lobe functioning and executive functioning (Grafman et al., 1993).
Perception of emotion-related stimuli, such as facial expression and voice tone, has been
found to be impaired in individuals with right hemisphere lesions (Joanette et al., 1990).
There is also some evidence that age influences the ability to process emotion-related
information, particularly information concerning negative emotions (McDowell et al., 1994;
Montepare et al., 1999). There is also evidence that individuals who sustain damage to the
frontal regions of the brain show deficits in executive functioning and in the identification of
facial and emotional expression (Homak et al., 1996). Evidence of impaired ability in
understanding subtle social and emotional cues has been shown with frontal lobe damage
following traumatic brain injury (Cicerone & Tanenbaum, 1997). These areas have also been
seen to be active in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks, as found in individuals with a diagnosis of
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994). ToM deficits reflect interpersonal impairments
sometimes seen in individuals following lesions in the frontal lobes, such as an apparent
disregard for social convention and an ego-centric attitude (Wood, 2001). Elappe et al.,
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(1999), investigated the hypothesis of acquired ToM deficits in individuals who had suffered
right hemisphere strokes and found stroke survivors to be significantly worse than controls in
their attribution ofmental states.
Impaired ability in the recognition of emotion has also been reported following, particularly,
right hemisphere lesions (Bowers et ah, 1991; Borod et ah, 2000). Additionally, there is
some evidence that the ability to process negative affect declines with age (McDowell et al.,
1994; Montepare, et al., 1999). From the literature it can be seen that extensive bodies of
research exists on individual aspects included in this study, such as emotion recognition and
executive function. However, as discussed, some of these studies may not be generalised to
stroke survivors for a number of reasons (e.g. age of participants or methodological flaws).
There is also a paucity of research in the area of psychosocial functioning and executive
function in post-stroke individuals, as many of these studies have involved individuals who
have autistic spectrum disorders. Additionally, the rehabilitation of stroke survivors is
dependent on a degree of social communication and the current research available suggests
that this may not be being conducted at an optimal level if indeed post stroke patients are
susceptible to deficits in psychosocial functioning. It is for these reasons that the present
study was carried out.
1.9 Aims
The main aim of this study is to investigate the ability of stroke survivors to recognise
emotional states in others, and if there is evidence of differences in the recognition of
positive and negative emotions in this group. The influence of location of lesion and age in
the recognition of emotion will also be investigated. The study also aims to examine whether
such individuals have difficulties in the perception of differing social and behavioural cues.
A further aim of the study is to investigate possible links between the abilities outlined above




1. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in the recognition of emotion
compared to controls
2. Stroke participants with right-sided lesions will show a reduced ability in the
recognition of negative emotions compared to the recognition of positive emotions
3. Older control participants will show a reduced ability in the recognition of negative
emotions compared to younger controls
Social Perception
4. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in social inference tasks compared to
controls
5. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in social comprehension tasks
compared to controls
Executive Function
6. In stroke participants, a positive and significant association will be shown between
performance on tasks of executive function and on tasks of emotion recognition
7. Stroke participants with lower scores on measures of executive function will also
show lower scores on tasks of social inference
8. Stroke participants with lower scores on measures of executive function will also








The study design involved both within subjects and between subjects comparisons. In
analysis, participant's scores were compared to normative data and to a control group. Each
participant in the stroke group was seen on two occasions in order to reduce fatigue and both
parts of the assessment were administered within 24 hours. Additionally, the administration
of tasks to some of the control subjects occurred in groups rather than individually. Many of
the controls subjects were recruited from orthopaedic patients and, unfortunately, the closure
of hospital theatres for maintenance occurred during the second half of the data collection
period. This event was unforeseen prior to arrangements for data collection being made. Care
was taken to ensure that this would not influence responses from participants by having
responses recorded in writing on a tick-box sheet (see Appendix 1) rather than verbally. A
control group was felt necessary as one of the main assessments (The Awareness of Social
Inference Test), had obtained normative data from individuals who were either exclusively
or predominately younger adults. In Part I of this test 93% of subjects were aged between 14
and 50 years, while in Part II all of the subjects were aged between 14 and 50 years. The
majority of participants in this present study were older adults.
The study was granted full approval by Grampian Research Ethics Committee.
2.2 Participants
The experimental group participants comprised 22 individuals who had received a diagnosis
of stroke and were in-patients of the Stroke Rehabilitation Centre at Woodend Hospital,
Aberdeen or the Acute Stroke Unit, Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, over the duration of the
study period. The participants involved in the control group were recruited via consultant's
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approval from the Departments of Orthopaedic Medicine and Medicine for the Elderly at
Woodend Hospital, Aberdeen.
2.2.1 Inclusion Criteria
To be involved in the study, stroke participants had to meet the following criteria:
" diagnosis of stroke (within the past 6 months)
■ adults over the age of 18 years
2.2.2 Exclusion Criteria
Participants were excluded from the study if they:
■ were currently aphasic
■ had a current or previous history ofpsychosis
■ were incapable of informed consent
■ had visual or aural impairments which would hinder performance of tasks
2.2.3 Demographic Information
The following information was recorded for both stroke and control subjects:
■ age
■ gender
■ length of formal education (in years)
2.3 Measures
In addition to an estimate of pre-morbid intelligence, the instruments used in this study are
believed to measure executive functioning, social perception and recognition of emotion. A
number of neuropsychological tests are believed to measure various aspects of executive
functioning (Lezak, 1995). Among the most widely used tests are the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test and the test of verbal fluency. Reduced performance on such tests is thought to
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reflect deficits in the executive control of cognitive processes (e.g. Baddeley & Delia Sala,
1996), though the evidence supporting this view has been questioned by others (e.g. Phillips,
1997).
2.3.1 National Adult Reading Test
A measurement of pre-morbid intelligence was obtained using the National Adult Reading
Test (NART) (Nelson & Willison, 1991). This is a reading test comprising of 50 common
and uncommon words that require irregular pronunciation (see Appendix 2). A score is
derived from the number of errors an individual makes as they read the words aloud one at a
time. Vocabulary is believed to correlate with overall intellectual ability and residual
vocabulary is felt to be the best indicator of pre-morbid mental ability (Lezak, 1995). A
factor analytic study combining NART and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WA1S) found
the NART error score to have a high loading on what was identified as Verbal Intelligence
(Crawford, Stewart, Cochrane, Parker & Besson, 1989). A series of studies on the NART
found significant correlations with education (r= .51), inter-rater reliability (r= .96 and .98)
and test-retest reliability (r= .98) (Crawford et al., 1989).
2.3.2 The Awareness of Social Inference Test
The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) (McDonald et al., 2002) was developed as
a valid and reliable instrument with which to assess social perception in order to address
such deficits following brain injury in a range of individuals in a multi-modal context. This
is achieved through the use of video, which provides visual, auditory and contextual cues.
This test consists of three parts (see Appendix 3): Part I measures an individual's ability to
recognise a range of seven emotional states in other people from short video sequences
{Happy, Surprised, Neutral, Sad, Angry, Anxious and Revolted). Parts II and III assess the
individual's ability to determine the intention of a character, the message they are trying to
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communicate, their beliefs and their emotional state (together described as social inference),
by discriminating between sincere communication exchanges, simple sarcastic exchanges
and paradoxical sarcastic exchanges. Sincere and simple sarcasm dialogue exchanges make
literal sense and are distinguished by cues such as the actor's tone of voice or facial
expression. For example, the sentence, "That tie really suits you." may be said either
sincerely or with sarcasm. However, dialogue in the paradoxical will only make sense if the
listener understands the speaker is being sarcastic. For example, an exchange showing an
enquirer to be content with the reply, "No, I tore it up and threw it away." to the question,
"Are you sure you have your passport? ", only makes sense if the response is understood to
be sarcastic.
Part II of the TASIT examines an individual's ability to infer intention and meaning based
solely on dialogue, emotional expression and related paralinguistic cues and in the absence
of additional information to help in this determination. Part III is described as Social
Inference (Enriched) because of the authors' inclusion of additional evidence describing the
true beliefs of the individual portrayed in each of the video sequences. All participants were
administered only Parts I and II of the TASIT as it was felt that an administration of Part III
would not have added significantly to the examination of the psychological processes under
investigation, when considerations such as the additional time commitment and possible
participant fatigue were weighed. Additionally, the TASIT is divided into Form A and Form
B, which comprise of the same situations but where the emotion or method used to deliver
the dialogue is altered (e.g. happy or fearful; sincere or sarcastic). This enables the test to be
used in a number of different ways, for example, in a test / re-test manner. Only Form A was
used in the current study.
Normative data for the TASIT was obtained from 279 adults and was designed as a criterion
referenced test where normal functioning individuals are expected to perform at near ceiling
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levels on all subtests. In validation studies comparing individuals who had sustained a brain
injury with controls, age and education were not significantly associated with performance
on Form A (McDonald et ah, 2002). An exploration of the effect of crystallised intelligence,
as measured by performance on Spot the Word (Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-Smith, 1992),
indicated that intelligence is not associated with performance on Part I, but was associated
with Part II and Part III, with shared variance ranging from 13-24% (McDonald et al.,
submitted).
Specific details of the psychometric properties associated with the TASIT are not available
to date. However, despite this, the decision to use the TASIT as a measure of social
perception was taken because of the test's design in assessing various elements of
communication across multiple channels. No other assessment was available that measures
verbal communication, visual communication and emotion recognition concurrently and in
such a comprehensive manner. The opportunity to apply multi-modal measures
simultaneously is seen as preferable to the extensive testing that would be required were
these elements to be assessed individually by other means.
The scoring of the TASIST (Parts I and II) is derived from a number of sources. Ten scores
are obtained from Part I, as follows:
■ number of correct items for each of the 7 emotional states
■ number of correct positive emotions identified
■ number of correct negative emotions identified
■ total number of positive and negative emotions identified
Eight scores are obtained in total for Part II, as follows:
■ number of sincere exchanges correctly identified
■ number of simple sarcasm exchanges correctly identified
■ number of paradoxical exchanges correctly identified
■ total number of correct social exchange items
Four total scores are also obtained by correctly identifying in each exchange the intention,
message, belief and emotional state of the target character.
2.3.3 Modified Card Sort Test
The Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) (Heaton, 1981) is among one of the most widely
used tests of executive functioning, examining functions such as shifting set and ability to
utilise feedback and modify behaviour accordingly, among others. Specifically, an examinee
is asked to place a sorting pack of 64 cards on which is printed symbols that vary in colour,
form and number under four stimulus cards. The examinee must sort the cards according to a
predetermined set of rules that may be deduced only from responses made by the examiner
to the pattern of sorting (colour, form or number). After ten consecutive correct responses,
the 'rule' is changed. Reliability studies of the WCST found intraclass correlation
coefficients (rICc) of .93 for perseverative responses, .92 for perseverative errors and .88 for
non-perseverative errors. Inter-rater reliability was also found to be high with rice of .96, rICc
of .94, and r/Cc of .91 for perseverative responses, perseverative errors and non-perseverative
errors respectively (Axelrod, Goldman & Woodard, 1992). Research into the validity of the
WCST in discriminating between subjects with neuropsychological impairment involving
the frontal lobes and executive functions from controls showed significant differences among
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groups, A=75, FMULT.(24, 2404.84)=8.42,/j<.0001 with group identification accounting for
25% of the variance in WCST scores (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay & Curtiss, 1993).
Consideration was given to shortcomings expressed by some researchers regarding the
WCST, including lengthy administration, which can be in excess of thirty minutes with
impaired individuals, frustration and fatigue. Consequently, a modified version (Nelson,
1976), which simplifies the task was decided upon in order to reduce fatigue, distress and
potential non-compliance. Nelson (1976) modified this test by removing all cards from the
sorting pack that share more than one attribute with a stimulus card. The modified card sort
test (MCST) reduces the number of cards to be sorted to 24 from the original 64. Nelson uses
twice the number of cards required, giving the subject 48 cards to sort against four stimulus
cards. The number of correct responses prior to changing the sorting rule is reduced from ten
to six and the sequence of rules is not predetermined but follows from the first two rules
decided upon by the subject. A score based on the number of sets obtained, which would
allow for a minimum of zero and a maximum of six (see Nelson, 1976). A termination rule
was used to avoid excessive anxiety and/or despondency whereby the task stopped if the
participant made twelve errors or more in attempting to obtain a set.
Nelson (1976) used the MCST to examine cognitive abilities in a group of individuals who
had sustained brain injuries of varied aetiology and among a control group. The MCST was
successful in differentiating between controls and both individuals with frontal lobe lesions
(67=908; Z=4.30, p<0.001) and individuals with lesions in other areas of the brain (67=885;
Z=2.94, p<0.002) on the number of categories obtained. The frontal lobe functions seen as
being most susceptible to impaired performance on the MCST include general cognitive
flexibility in problem solving and the ability to utilise feedback. Both of these functions are
seen as being key to appropriate executive functioning.
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2.3.4 The Controlled Oral Word Association
The Controlled Oral Word Association (COWA) (Benton & Hamsher, 1978) is a test of
verbal fluency in which individuals are asked to provide as many words as they can in one
minute belonging first to a category (animals), then words beginning with a given letter (C, F
and L, respectively), excluding proper nouns, numbers and the same word with a different
suffix (see Appendix 4). Reduced verbal fluency is associated with frontal lobe damage
(Janowsky, Shimamura, Kritchevsky & Squire, 1989), though studies using positron
emission tomography also indicates the involvement of the temporal lobes (Parks,
Loewenstein, Dodrill, Barker, Yoshii, Chang et al., (1988). Low verbal production is believed to
reflect impaired mental flexibility and difficulty shifting set between letters, which are
considered important components of executive functioning (Mitrushina, Boon & D'Elia,
1999). A score based on the total number of responses provided is obtained and adjusted for
age and years of education (Gladsjo, Miller & Heaton, 1999). An analysis of internal
consistency for the COWA (Ruff, Light, Parker & Levin, 1996) indicated a high co-efficient
a (r= .83) for the three letters, thereby indicating high test homogeneity. Additionally, Ruff
et ah, (1996) reported a test-retest reliability co-efficient of r= .74 using an alternative letter
set.
2.3.5 DEX Questionnaire: Behavioural Assmt of the Dysexecutive Syndrome
The Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX) (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie & Evans,
1996) is a 20-item instrument designed to measure a range of competencies commonly
believed to be involved in executive functioning. Each item is measured on a five point (0-4)
Likert scale, ranging from 'Never' to 'Very Often'. There are two versions of the DEX
questionnaire, one that is completed by the individual (see Appendix 5) and the other
completed by someone who knows the individual well (e.g. a relative or carer) (see
Appendix 6) and who has experience in observing them in social situations. Two scores, one
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based on self-rated responses and one on the independent rater's responses were obtained,
whereby a higher scores indicates poorer executive functioning. The overall profile score of
dysexecutive difficulties as found using the BADS was found to highly correlate with carers'
/ relatives' ratings on the DEX questionnaire of executive functioning in a study of 90 brain-
injured individuals (Wilson et al., 1996).
2.4 Medical Data
When permission had been obtained from the stroke group participants, the following data
was obtained retrospectively from medical notes:
■ location of lesion
■ date of admission following stroke
2.5 Procedure
2.5.1 Stroke Group
Potential participants were identified from patients referred to the unit during the time of the
study. The Consultant in charge of patient care determined which patients they considered it
would be appropriate to assess with regard to the criteria for inclusion, otherwise all
individuals who met the criteria for inclusion in the study were approached. A member of
staff then approached the individual and briefly explained the study, providing them with an
information sheet outlining the rationale and procedure (see Appendix 7). If the individual
agreed, the researcher then met with them to fully explain the background of the study and
provide an opportunity for questions. Potential participants were given one week in which to
peruse the information provided and consider taking part. Discussion with friends and family
members was encouraged. It was emphasised that the individual was not obliged to
participate and that they could have withdrawn from the project at any time with no
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consequences. If the individual agreed to take part, they were asked to sign a consent form
(see Appendix 8).
As the complete test battery took approximately 90 minutes, testing was split into two
sessions to reduce possible effects of fatigue. Session one comprised the video aspect of the
TASIT and took approximately 50 minutes. Session two comprised the neuropsychological
tests outlined above and took approximately 40 minutes. The DEX questionnaire was given
out at this time to both the individual and a significant other who had frequent contact with
the participant (in all cases this was a staffmember).
2.5.2 Control Group
A control group of 17 individuals matched on gender, age and education was used to
establish appropriate comparison data for Parts I and II of the TASIT (Form A). Participants
for the control group were recruited from the in-patients of two orthopaedic wards and from
two wards for Medicine for the Elderly at Woodend Hospital Aberdeen over the duration of
the study. The inclusion criteria were adults with no reported neurological conditions and the
exclusion criteria were the same as that described above for stroke sufferers. Control
participants were provided with similar information regarding the study as stroke patients but
with some alteration regarding what they would be required to do.
2.6 Data Analysis
The patient group's performance on neuropsychological tests was compared to population
norms and to controls for the video aspect of the study. Due to the numbers involved in each
of the groups and because an initial exploration of the data identified two outliers in the
stroke group (one for age and one for years of education), non-parametric tests were run on
the data obtained. All statistical analyses were carried out using the Statistical Package for
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the Social Sciences for Windows (SPSS for Windows: Version 10.0). These involved Mann-
Whitney U tests, Spearman correlational analyses (one-tailed and two-tailed) and Wilcoxon
matched pairs signed rank tests. The size of the correlation coefficients are based upon the
definitions provided by Cohen & Holliday (1982):
.00 to .19 is very low
.20 to .39 is low
.40 to .69 is modest
.70 to .89 is high
.90 to 1.00 is very high
2.7 Statistical Power
The most important assessment is the TASIT, therefore power has been deduced on this test.
Power was also calculated for two important tests of executive functioning - The Modified
Card Sorting Test (Nelson, 1976) and the California Oral Word Association (Benton &
Hamsher, 1978) - which showed that for each of these tests the number of subjects
calculated in the TASIT power calculation was adequate. Evidence from the available
literature suggests that an important difference between normal subjects and those post-
stroke would be approximately 2 points on the TASIT scale, with a standard deviation 2.1
points on the scale from the published data set. Therefore, to detect a statistically significant
difference (a = 0.05) with power of 0.8, 22 subjects would be required in both the






Forty-two individuals were approached to participate in this study: 25 stroke participants and
17 controls. All 17 controls and 23 of the 25 stroke survivors agreed to take part. Another
stroke patient agreed but when testing began it became clear that he was having difficulty
hearing the audio track of the video aspect of the study. As a consequence of this no further
testing was undertaken with this gentleman and his data are not included. In all, 39
participants took part, comprising 22 stroke survivors and 17 controls.
3.1.1 Stroke Group Characteristics
Twenty-two individuals who had suffered a stroke participated in this study.
3.1.2 Location of Lesions
The locations of lesion were obtained from medical records and ordered into seven broad
categories following discussion with medical colleagues: right anterior, posterior and
subcortical; left anterior, posterior and subcortical; and cerebellum. Nine individuals had
suffered stroke in the right sub-cortical region of the brain. The left subcortical region was
the second most common area of lesion with six lesions recorded in this region. The
remainder were divided between the right posterior, right anterior and cerebellum. Figure 3.1




3.1.3 Time Since Event
Eighteen participants in the stroke group were between 1 and 2 months post-stroke, three
individuals were 2 months and one each at four and five months post-stroke (Median (Mdn) =
2.0 months, Inter Ouartile Range (IOR) = 1.0 month).
3.1.4 National Adult Reading Test (NART)
Error scores on the NART ranged from 1 to 35 (M = 23.5, SD = 6.5), which provided an
estimate of pre-morbid IQ. As illustrated in Table 3.1, all members of the group showed
estimated pre-morbid IQ scores within the normal range (M = 101.5, SI) = 7.8).
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TABLE 3.1: Estimated pre-morbid IQ
Estimated Pre-morbid IQ Range (n=22)
80-89 90-99 100-109 110-119 120-129
1 7 12 1 1
3.2 Demographics of Participants
3.2.1 Gender
Of the twenty-three stroke survivors who agreed to take part, twenty-two met the all the
criteria for inclusion in the study (12 males and 10 females) and seventeen control
individuals (9 males and 8 females) who met the criteria for inclusion were invited to
participate.
3.2.2 Age
The distribution of age of both the stroke and control group are outlined in Table 3.2






Stroke 33 82 65.8 11.6
Control 39 82 67.3 12.1
Nineteen (86%) of the 22 participants in the stroke group were aged between 60 and 82 years
with two aged between 50 and 59 years and one participant aged 33 years. Sixteen (94%) of




Number of year's education was obtained from each person in both groups. Of the stroke
group, seventeen individuals (77%) reported having between 8 and 10 years education with
four (18%) having between 11 and 15 years (M 10.6 years; SD 3.8 years). One individual
reported having 27 years education. Eleven individuals (65%) in the control group reported
having between 8 and 10 years education with six (35%) having between 11 and 15 years (M
10.4 years; SD 1.8 years). Table 3.3 shows the breakdown within each group.





77% 18% 5% 100%
Control
(N=17)
65% 35% 0% 100%
3.4 Stroke Group Tests of Executive Function
Tasks of executive function were administered only to members of the stroke group.
3.4.1 California Oral Word Association Test (COWA)
Category Fluency
The scores obtained on the category fluency task are outlined in Table 3.4 (Mdn = 13.0, IQR
= 8.25).
TABLE 3.4: COWA category fluency scores
Median IQR Mean SD Min Max
13.0 8.2 13.7 4.3 1 21
(Stroke Group n=22)
IQR: Inter Quartile Range; SD: Standard Deviation
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COWA Letter Fluency
Raw scores obtained on the COWA verbal fluency test by members of the stroke group were
converted to standard scores. Table 3.5 shows the median and interquartile range of these
scores. A range of standard scores was observed from 3 to 12.
TABLE 3.5: COWA letter fluency scores
Median IQR Mean SD Min Max"
7.8 4.6 7.6 2.6 3 12
(Stroke Group n=22)
* Minimum possible standard score = 2; ** Maximum possible standard score = 18
IQR: Inter Quartile Range; SD: Standard Deviation
3.4.2 Modified Card Sort Task (MCST)
Only four individuals obtained the required number of six sets to pass the task. Ten
individuals obtained two sets or below and eleven obtained four sets or more. Table 3.6
shows the range of sets obtained among the stroke group.
TABLE 3.6: Range of sets obtained on MCST
No. of Sets obtained (n=22)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2 1 8 0 4 3 4
3.4.3 DEX Questionnaire
Table 3.7 shows the median and interquartile range values for both versions of the
questionnaire. It can be seen from the scores that there was a trend for stroke patients to rate
themselves as having more executive functioning difficulties than did the independent raters.
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TABLE 3.7: DEX Self- and Independent-rated Questionnaire scores
Median IQR Min Max *
DEX Self-rated Q 16.0 14.0 0 48
DEX Independent Q 8.5 13.3 1 53
* Minimum possible score = zero ** Maximum possible score = 80 (n=22)
No significant differences were found between the self-rated and independently-rated
questionnaires using Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test (Z = -1.86,/? = 0.063).
3.4.4 Relationships between Tasks of Executive Function and DEX Q
Table 3.8 shows the results of a Spearman's correlational analysis. This indicates significant
correlations between the following executive function tasks: MCST and COWA Letter (rs =
.64, p < 0.01); MCST and COWA Category (rs = .43, p < 0.05); and COWA Letter and
COWA Category (rs = .56, p < 0.01). However, while the correlational analyses involving
the executive function tasks and both the DEX Questionnaires were all in the expected
direction (i.e. a negative relationship), no significant correlations were found.
TABLE 3.8: Executive function tasks and DEX-questionnaire
Variables 1 2 3 4
1. MCST
2. COWA Letter 0.64** - - -
3. COWA Category 0.43* 0.56** - -
4. DEX Self-rated Q -0.24 -0.36 -0.16 -
5. DEX Independently-rated Q -0.37 -0.25 -0.05 0.14
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
(n=22)
MCST: Modified Card Sorting Task; COWA:
Controlled Oral Word Association; DEX Q:
Dysexecutive syndrome questionnaire.
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3.5 Social Cognition Tasks
3.5.1 The Awareness of Social Inference Test (Part I)
Recognition of Emotion
Table 3.9 shows the range of scores obtained by stroke group participants for each of the
seven emotional states. This indicates that both Happy and Surprised were correctly
identified on at least two of the four occasions by all 22 stroke participants, with Anxious
identified on at least two of four occasions by 21 of the 22. In contrast, only 11 of the stroke
participants identified Neutral on at least two of the four occasions.
As illustrated in Table 3.10, all members of the control group correctly identified Happy
three times or more out of four trials. However, only 8 individuals managed to achieve this
for the Neutral condition. Fifteen controls correctly identified Anxious three times out of four
but only 9 achieved this for the emotion Revolted.
Ability in task performance was noted between different emotional states with, for example,
50% of the stroke group failing to identify Neutral more than once over four trials compared
to 18% of controls. However, only 14% of stroke patients and 18% of controls correctly
identified Sad on all four occasions. Wilcoxon matched pairs tests were carried out on the
above data in order to investigate possible differences of significance within each of the
groups. However, the application of multiple comparison procedures raises the issue of
increasing the probability of making Type I errors (Howell, 1992). One way to control for
these errors is to divide the p value (0.05) by the number of tests undertaken (Dancey &
Reidy (1999) p.173). In these analyses 21 Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests were
carried out, thus a p value of (0.002) was indicated. All significant results meeting this more
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conservative probability value or less have been annotated with an asterisk. Table 3.11
shows the analyses for the stroke group.




Happy Surprised Neutral Sad Angry Anxious Revolted
0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 8 2 3 0 4
2 2 1 4 8 1 3 7
3 11 8 4 8 11 6 4
4 9 13 3 3 7 12 7
Median 3.0 4.0 1.5 2.5 3.0 4.0 2.5




Happy Surprised Neutral Sad Angry Anxious Revolted
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3
1 0 0 3 2 2 1 2
2 0 1 6 4 4 1 3
3 7 8 7 7 7 3 5
4 10 8 1 3 3 12 4
Median 4.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0
Stroke patients were significantly more successful at identifying Happy than Neutral (p<
0.01*); Happy than Sad (p< 0.01*); and Happy than Revolted (p< 0.05). Surprised was more
successfully identified than Neutral (p< 0.01*), Sad (p< 0.01*) or Revolted (p< 0.01).
Neutral was less successfully identified than Sad (p< 0.05), Angry (p< 0.01*), Anxious (p<
0.01*), or Revolted (p< 0.01). Anxious was more easily identified than either Sad (p< 0.01) or
Revolted (p< 0.01).
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TABLE 3.11: Wilcoxon tests of differences between emotion recognition scores (stroke)
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Happy Z score —
P value --
2. Surprised Z score 1.18 —
P value .236 —
3. Neutral Z score 3.54 3.76 —
P value .000 .000 —
4. Sad Z score 2.79 3.45 2.15 —
P value .005 .001 .032 —
5. Angry Z score 1.51 1.90 3.19 1.87 —
P value .131 .057 .001 .061 —
6. Anxious Z score 0.12 1.39 3.67 2.62 1.12 —
P value .904 .163 .000 .009 .261 —
7. Revolted Z score 2.45 2.91 3.12 0.78 1.53 1.53
P value .014 .004 .002 .435 .125 .125
Significant correlations were also found in the control group (Table 3.12). Happy was more
easily identified than Neutral (p< 0.01*), Sad (p< 0.01*), Angry [p< 0.01*) or Revolted (p<
0.01). Surprised was more easily identified than Neutral (p< 0.01*), Sad (p< 0.05), Angry
(p< 0.05) or Revolted {p< 0.01). Anxious was more easily identified than Neutral (p< 0.01*),
Sad (p< 0.05), Angry (p< 0.05) or Revolted (p< 0.01*).
TABLE 3.12: Wilcoxon tests of differences between emotion recognition scores (controls)
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Happy Z score —
P value —
2. Surprised Z score -1.134 —
P value 0.257 —
3. Neutral Z score -3.109 -3.145 —
P value 0.002 0.002 —
4. Sad Z score -3.169 -2.496 -0.548 —
P value 0.002 0.013 0.584 —
5. Angry Z score -3.307 -2.508 -0.522 -0.061 —
P value 0.001 0.012 0.601 0.952 —
6. Anxious Z score 0.000 -0.632 -3.272 -2.445 -2.441 —
P value 1.000 0.527 0.001 0.014 0.015 —
7. Revolted Z score -2.791 -2.687 -0.042 -0.622 -0.725 -3.269
P value 0.005 0.007 -0.967 0.534 0.469 0.001
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Identification of Positive and Negative Emotions
Table 3.13 shows the median and interquartile range of correctly identified positive and
negative emotions for each of the two groups. The TASIT categorises Happy, Surprised and
Neutral as positive emotions and Sad, Angry, Anxious and Revolted as negative emotions.
Analyses were carried out using this categorisation.
TABLE 3.13: Positive and negative emotion category scores
Median IQR Min Max
Positive Emotions* Stroke 9.0 4.0 5 11
Control 10.0 2.0 7 12
Negative Emotions" Stroke 11.0 5.2 7 16
Control 12.0 4.5 5 15
Total Emotions Score Stroke 19.0 9.0 14 26
Control 20.0 5.5 13 27
* Maximum possible score = 12; ** Maximum possible score = 16
stroke (n=22), control (n=17)
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests were carried out for within group differences in
correctly identifying positive and negative emotions. The results of these analyses indicated
no significant difference within the stroke group (Z = -0.558, p = 0.577) but a significant
difference was found within the control group (Z = -2.388, p = 0.017). However, the low
scores observed on the Neutral state was felt to be confounding the positive emotion scores
and post-hoc analyses were conducted using Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests
following an adjustment of the positive category to contain only Happy and Surprised. The
results of these analyses indicated highly significant differences in both groups in correctly
identifying positive and negative emotional states: Stroke group (Z = -3.173, p < 0.01);
Control group (Z= -3.254,p < 0.01).
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3.5.1 The Awareness of Social Inference Test (Part II)
3.5.1(a) Social Inference (Part Ila)
Social Inference scores were obtained for correctly identifying each of the three modes of
communication in five video scenarios. In the identification of sincere exchanges almost
60% of the stroke sample obtained a score of 15 or more out of 20. However, this decreased
to 50% in the correct identification of simple sarcasm and 54% in the correct identification
of paradoxical sarcasm. Ten (45%) of the 22 participants obtained a total Social Inference
score of less than 75% correct. Table 3.14 shows the median and interquartile range of scores
for each of the three modes of communication.
In the identification of sincere exchanges almost 59% of the control sample obtained a score
of 15 or more out of 20. However, this decreased to 35% in the correct identification of
simple sarcasm and 41% in the correct identification of paradoxical sarcasm. Thirteen (76%)
of the 17 participants obtained a total Social Inference score of less than 75% correct. Table
3.15 shows the median and interquartile range of scores for each of the three modes of
communication.
As illustrated in Table 3.16, a highly significant positive association was found using
Spearman correlations between Simple Sarcasm and Paradoxical Sarcasm (rs = .74, p <0.01)
among the stroke group. A significant positive association was also found between Simple
Sarcasm and Paradoxical Sarcasm (rs = .51 ,p< 0.05) among the control group (see Table
3.17).
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TABLE 3.14: TASIT scores (Part Ha) Stroke Group
Social Inference Factor Mdn IQR M SD Min Max
Sincere Exchanges 15.0 5.0 14.5 3.5 5 20
Simple Sarcasm 15.0 9.8 14.0 5.2 5 20
Paradoxical Sarcasm 15.0 6.8 13.9 4.8 3 20
Total Social Inference Score 45.5 12.3 42.4 9.5 24 55
TABLE 3.15: TASIT scores (Part Ha) Control Group
Social Inference Factor Mdn IQR M SD Min Max
Sincere Exchanges 15.0 3.5 14.9 2.6 9 19
Simple Sarcasm 13.0 10.0 12.5 5.0 5 20
Paradoxical Sarcasm 13.0 7.0 13.7 3.4 9 19
Total Social Inference Score 42.0 8.5 41.1 7.5 27 55
TABLE 3.16: Social Inference factors (Stroke Group)
Variables 1 2
1. Sincere Exchanges - ~
2. Simple Sarcasm -0.16 -
3. Paradoxical Sarcasm -0.23 0.74**
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
TABLE 3.17: Social Inference factors (Control Group)
Variables 1 2
1. Sincere Exchanges
2. Simple Sarcasm -0.27 -
3. Paradoxical Sarcasm 0.13 0.51*
Spearman Correlations
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
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3.5.1(b) Social Comprehension (Part lib)
Nineteen (86%) stroke participants obtained a score of 60% or above in correctly identifying
the intention, message, and emotional state of actors. This decreased slightly to 14 (64%) in
correctly identifying beliefs. However, only twelve participants (55%) obtained a total score
of 75% correct or above in this task. Table 3.18 shows the median and interquartile range of
responses for the stroke group. Fifteen control participants (88%) obtained a score of 60% or
above in correctly identifying the intention and message being conveyed in this task, and 12
(71%) achieved a score of 60%+. However, only 10 (59%) obtained this level of scoring in
correctly identifying beliefs. Additionally, only four controls (24%) obtained a total score of
75% correct or above in this task. Table 3.19 shows the median and interquartile range of
scores obtained by the control group.






Median IQR Mean SD Min Max
Doing Intentions 11.0 3.0 11.4 2.1 1 14
Saying Message 12.0 4.5 10.8 2.7 6 14
Thinking Beliefs 10.5 5.0 9.6 3.1 4 13
Feeling* Emotionalstate 11.0 2.5 10.9 2.2 5 14
Total SC Score** 45.5 12.3 42.4 9.5 24 55
* Min possible score is zero, Max possible score is 15; **Max possible total score is 60






Median IQR Mean SD Min Max
Doing* Intentions 11.0 3.0 10.3 2.2 1 14
Saying Message 11.0 4.0 10.9 2.4 6 15




11.0 4.5 10.5 2.4 6 14
Total SC Score*** 42.0 8.5 41.1 7.5 27 55
* Min possible score is zero, Max possible score is 15; **Max possible total score is 60
71
Spearman correlational analyses were carried out to explore the relationship between the
four factors involved in Social Comprehension (Table 3.20). The results of these analyses for
the stroke group indicate significant positive correlations between the factors involved: the
ability to identify the intentions of a character in a social scenario was highly correlated with
the ability to identify the message being given (rs = .86, p = 0.01), the beliefs held by the
character (rs = .77, p = 0.01), and his emotional state (rs = .71, p = 0.01). The ability to
understand the message being put across is highly correlated with understanding their beliefs
(rs = .82, p = 0.01) and what they are feeling (rs = .75, p = 0.01). A very significant
relationship was also found between the ability to understand beliefs and identify the
emotional state of a character (rs = .73, p = 0.01).
Table 3.21 shows the results of this analysis for the control group: a significant relationship
between control participants' ability to identify the intentions and the emotional state of an
actor in a social situation (rs = .59, p = 0.05). A highly significant correlation was found
between the ability to identify the message being put across and the ability to identify the
beliefs of an actor (rs = .39, p = 0.05).
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TABLE 3.20: Social Inference factors (Stroke Group)
Variables 1 2 3
I1IoQ
2. Say 0.86** - -
3. Think 0.77** 0.82** -
4. Feel 0.71** 0.75** 0.73"
Spearman Correlations
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
TABLE 3.21: Social Inference factors (Control Group)
Variables 1 2 3
II!oQ
2. Say 0.31 -- -
3. Think 0.52* 0.61** -
4. Feel 0.59* 0.33 0.46
Spearman Correlations
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
3.5.2 Results in Relation to Specific Hypotheses
1. Stroke patients will show a reduced ability in the recognition of emotion
compared to controls.
In order to test this hypothesis Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to compare the two
groups (Table 3.22). The results indicate that there were no differences in the ability to
correctly identify emotional states between the groups, therefore this hypothesis was not
upheld.
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TABLE 3.22: Emotional state recognition between stroke patients and controls
Emotion Median IQR U Z P
Happy 3.0 1.0 146.500 -1.293 0.196
Surprised 4.0 1.0 164.500 -0.724 0.469
Neutral 2.0 2.0 135.500 -1.507 0.132
Sad 3.0 1.0 175.000 -0.356 0.722
Angry 3.0 2.0 139.000 -1.448 0.148
Anxious 4.0 1.0 157.500 -0.962 0.336
Revolted 3.0 2.0 165.500 -0.626 0.531
Total Score 20.0 8.0 177.500 -0.270 0.787
The ability of stroke participants and controls to correctly identify emotions as being either
positive or negative was examined by looking at the pattern of errors made by each of the
two groups. The errors were identified as being Within-Type (e.g. an incorrectly identified
positive emotions being identified for another positive emotion) or Outwith-Type (e.g. an
incorrectly identified positive emotion being identified for a negative emotion). Mann-
Whitney U tests were conducted on the number of Within-Type and Outwith-Type errors
made for positive and negative emotions (Table 3.23).
TABLE 3.23: Within-Type error differences between stroke patients and controls
Errors Within-Type Mdn IQR U Z P
Positive 2.0 1.0 181.500 -0.164 0.870
Negative 3.0 4.0 167.500 -0.559 0.576
The results of this analysis indicates that there were no significant differences between stroke
patients and controls in correctly identifying a particular positive emotion as another positive
emotion, or a particular negative emotion as another negative emotion. Table 3.24 also
shows the results of a Mann-Whitney U test carried out on Outwith-Type errors made. This
indicates a trend towards misidentifying a negative emotion as a positive emotion (as
opposed to another negative emotion).
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TABLE 3.24: Outwith-Type errors between groups
Errors Outwith-Type Mdn IQR U Z P
Positive 1.0 2.0 144.00 -1.264 0.206
Negative 1.0 2.0 126.000 -1.767 0.077
The results of these analyses show that there were no significant differences between stroke
patients and controls in making errors Outwith-Type for either positive or negative emotions.
That is, there were no significant differences between patients and controls in their
likelihood of incorrectly identifying a positive emotion as a negative emotion, or vice versa.
2. Stroke patients with right-sided lesions will show a reduced ability in the
recognition of negative emotions compared to positive emotions
An analysis was conducted using a Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test on 15 stroke
participants who had sustained right-sided lesions. The results of this analysis indicated there
was no significant difference between correctly identified positive and negative emotion
emotional states in this group (Z = -0.377, p = 0.706). This hypothesis, therefore, was not
upheld.
3. Older control participants will show a reduced ability in the recognition of
negative emotions compared to younger controls
An analysis was conducted using Spearman correlations in order to establish whether a
relationship existed between age and ability to identify emotional states (Table 3.25). While
it can be seen that a significant positive correlation exists between positive and negative
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emotions identified (p< 0.01), no significant relationship was found between age and ability
to identify either positive or negative emotions.
TABLE 3.25: Correlations between age and recognition of positive and negative (controls)
Variables 1 2 3
1. Age
2. Positive Emotions -0.12 - -
3. Negative Emotions -0.37 0.63" -
4. Total Emotions -0.30 0.85" 0.93"
Spearman Correlations: n=l 7
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
4. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in social inference tasks
compared to controls.
Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to compare the scores of the two groups on Social
Inference tasks (Table 3.26). It can be seen that no significant differences between the
groups were found on scores of social inference, therefore, this hypothesis was not upheld.
TABLE 3.26: Social inference between stroke patients and controls
Social Inference Mdn IQR U Z P
Sincere 15.0 4.0 183.000 -0.114 0.909
Simple Sarcasm 13.0 9.0 151.000 -1.025 0.305
Paradoxical Sarcasm 14.0 8.0 170.500 -0.469 0.639
Total Score 43.0 11.0 162.000 -0.709 0.478
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5. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in social comprehension tasks
compared to controls.
Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to compare the scores between the stroke group and
controls on Social Comprehension tasks (Table 3.27). The results of these analyses indicate
that no significant differences between the groups were found on scores of social
comprehension, therefore, this hypothesis was not upheld.
TABLE 3.27: Social comprehension differences between stroke patients and controls
Social Comprehension Mdn IQR U Z P
Doing 11.0 3.0 144.500 -1.217 0.224
Saying 12.0 4.0 180.500 -0.187 0.852
Thinking 10.0 5.0 173.000 -0.399 0.690
Feeling 11.0 3.0 166.500 -0.587 0.558
Total Score 43.0 11.0 162.000 -0.709 0.478
6. In stroke participants, a positive and significant association will be shown
between performance on tasks of executive function and on tasks of emotion
recognition
In order to test this hypothesis Spearman correlations were carried out. As shown in Table
3.28, the ability to identify positive emotions was significant correlated with performance on
all tasks of executive functioning but not with either of the DEX questionnaire scores:
MCST (p < 0.01), COWA Letter task (p < 0.01) and COWA Category task (p < 0.01).
Ability in identifying negative emotions was also significantly correlated with the following
tasks: MCST (p < 0.01), and COWA Letter task (p < 0.01). Thus, this hypothesis was
largely supported.
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TABLE 3.28: Correlations between executive function tasks and emotion recognition tasks
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. MCST -- - - - - -
2. COWA Letter 0.64** - - - - -
3. COWA Category 0.43** 0.56** - - - -
4. DEX Self-R Q -0.24 -0.36 -0.16 - - -
5. DEX Ind-R Q -0.37 -0.25 -0.05 0.14 - -
6. Positive Emotions 0.70** 0.56** 0.55** -0.27 -0.36 -
7. Negative Emotions 0.80** 0.55** 0.31 -0.16 -0.47* 0.66**
Spearman Correlations: n=22
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
7. Stroke participants with lower scores on tasks of executive function will also
show lower scores in tasks of social inference
In order to test this hypothesis, Spearman correlations were carried out. As can be seen in
Table 3.29 performance on the MCST was associated with ability to identify simple sarcasm
(p < 0.01) and paradoxical sarcasm (p < 0.01); performance on the COWA Letter task was
also significantly correlated with ability in identifying simple sarcasm (p < 0.05);
performance of the COWA Category task was significantly correlated with ability to detect
simple sarcasm (p < 0.05). This hypothesis was therefore supported.
TABLE 3.29: Correlations between executive function tasks and social inference tasks
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. MCST - - - -- - - -
2. COWA Letter 0.64** - -- - - ~ -
3. COWA Category 0.43* 0.56" - - -- - --
4. DEX Self-R Q -0.24 -0.36 -0.16 - -- -- --
5. DEX Ind-R Q -0.37 -0.25 -0.05 0.14 -- - -
6. Sincere Exchange 0.07 0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.11 - -
7. Simple Sarcasm 0.76" 0.44* 0.43* 0.00 -0.29 -0.17 --
8. Paradox Sarcasm 0.51** 0.30 0.20 0.23 -0.23 -0.23 0.68"
Spearman Correlations: n=22
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
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8. Stroke participants with lower scores on tasks of executive function will also
show lower scores in tasks of social comprehension
In order to test this hypothesis, Spearman correlations were carried out. Table 3.30 outlines
the results which shows a number of very significant relationships between scores.
Performance on the MCST is associated with ability to identify the intention of an actor {p <
0.01), the message they were trying to convey (p < 0.01), their beliefs (p < 0.01) and their
emotional state (p < 0.01). Performance on the COWA Letter task is significantly correlated
with ability in identifying the intention of an actor (p < 0.05), their message (p < 0.05), their
beliefs (p < 0.05) and their emotional state {p < 0.05). Performance of the COWA Category
task is significantly correlated with ability to comprehend the message an actor is trying to
convey (p < 0.05). This hypothesis was therefore, supported.
TABLE 3.30: Correlations between executive function tasks and social comprehension tasks
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. MCST
2. COWA Letter 0.64" - - - - - --
3. COWA Category 0.43* 0.56" - - - - -
4. DEX Self-R Q -0.24 -0.36 -0.16 - - - -
5. DEX Ind-R Q -0.37 -0.25 -0.05 0.14 - -- --
6. Do 0.66** 0.45* 0.19 0.04 -0.34 - --
7. Say 0.67" 0.46* 0.38* 0.08 -0.38 0.65" --
8. Think 0.71" 0.40* 0.18 0.09 -0.36 0.68" 0.79"
9. Feel 0.55** 0.39* 0.22 0.22 -0.19 0.67* 0.60" 0.59"
Spearman Correlation: n=22
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).





This discussion will begin with a brief summary of the findings and in the following sections
the general findings of the study will be outlined with regard to the areas investigated. The
specific hypotheses tested will be explored and discussed with consideration given to
potential implications for clinical practice. Issues of a methodological and ethical nature will
then be discussed with attention to statistical analyses and the participants involved in the
study. Consideration of the materials used in this study will also be included and
implications for possible future research will be outlined in the conclusion.
4.1 Summary of Findings
The main findings of this study indicated significant differences within both the stroke group
and controls group in the ability to correctly identify different emotional states but no
significant differences were found between these two groups. Post-hoc analyses also showed
significant differences within groups but not between when emotional states were
dichotomised into positive and negative conditions. No significant differences were found in
the ability of individuals with right-hemisphere lesions to distinguish between positive and
negative emotions, nor was a relationship found between this ability and age. No significant
differences were found between the stroke group and controls in their ability to identify
between sincere and sarcastic messages. Also, the ability to correctly identify the behaviour,
the meaning of verbal communication, the beliefs held and emotional state of others was
found not be significantly different between these two groups. However, a significant
positive correlation was found within the stroke group between performance on tasks of
executive function and the ability to recognise emotional states. The ability to make
inferences from verbal exchanges and the ability to identify the behaviour, meaning, beliefs
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and emotional state of others was also found to be significantly and positively correlated
with tasks of executive functioning.
4.1.1 General Findings
The above finding will now be discussed in relations to each of the areas investigated in this
study: the recognition of emotion; social awareness; and executive functioning.
4.1.2 Recognition of Emotion
Both in the stroke group and the control group, significant differences were found in
participants' ability to correctly identify between particular emotional states. The findings
showed that the emotional states Happy, Surprised and Anxious were the three most
correctly identified emotional states amongst both the stroke group and the controls. The two
least correctly identified emotional states were Neutral and Sad amongst the stroke group
and Neutral and Revolted amongst the control group. However, when the emotional states
were categorised into positive and negative, no significant difference was found. Post-hoc
analyses carried out following removal of Neutral state emotions from the positive category
revealed significant differences in both groups in ability to correctly identify positive over
negative emotional states.
4.1.3 Social Inference
Differences in the ability to correctly identify communication expressed over three modes
(sincere exchanges, simple sarcasm and paradoxical sarcasm) were observed in the stroke
group. Stroke participants obtained higher scores in conditions involving sincere exchanges
than either simple sarcasm or paradoxical sarcasm. A similar pattern was observed in the
control group. Analyses of the data indicated significant correlations between the simple and
paradoxical sarcasm scores for both groups. The sincere exchange condition scores were
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found not to be correlated with either of the sarcasm condition scores in either of the two
groups.
4.1.4 Social Comprehension
Similar scores were obtained by both groups in correctly identifying the intention and
message being conveyed in social comprehension tasks, with lower scores obtained for
correctly identifying beliefs among both the stroke patients and controls. Overall, the stroke
group obtained higher scores than controls, but not significantly so. Analyses of the scores
obtained by the stroke group in each of the four conditions indicated significant relationships
between all of the factor scores involved. This was less pronounced in analyses of the data
obtained by the control group, with only three of the six possible correlations showing
significance.
4.1.4 Executive Function
Tests of executive function were administered to members of the stroke group only.
Correlational analysis of the executive tasks used in this study and the DEX Questionnaires
showed significant relationships between all tasks but not with either of the DEX
questionnaires. An analysis of the data obtained from the DEX questionnaires revealed no
significant differences between the stroke patients' ratings of themselves and the
independent ratings made of them by members of the nursing staff. However, compared to
staff ratings, there was a trend for patients to rate themselves as having more executive
functioning difficulties. Emotion recognition scores and performance on social inference and
social comprehension tasks were significantly associated with executive functioning.
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4.2 Hypotheses
Each of the above findings will be explored in more detail in relation to the specific
hypotheses. The hypotheses are numbered as they are in the introduction.
Hypothesis 1. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in the
recognition of emotion compared to controls
The results indicated that there were no significant differences in the ability to correctly
identify emotional states between the stroke group and controls. This finding does not
support those found by other studies which suggest that individuals who have suffered injury
to the brain following stroke show impairments in the recognition of emotion compared to
non brain-injured individuals (e.g. Borod et al., 1998). A number of studies have shown that
individuals who have sustained a brain injury demonstrate impairment in recognising
emotion in others and these deficits have been observed with lesions in different areas of the
brain (Cicone et al., 1980; Hornak et al., 1996). It was hypothesised, therefore, that
individuals who had sustained lesions following stroke would be likely to demonstrate
deficits in the ability to accurately discriminate between different emotional states using the
TASIT. However no such differences between the groups were found.
Analyses of the data to establish differences in obtained correct scores for emotions
categorised as either positive or negative indicated no significant differences within the
stroke group, though a significant difference was found within the control group. However,
following the removal of the Neutral state emotion scores from the positive emotion
category, significant differences were observed for both groups on the number of correctly
identified positive and negative emotions, with both the stroke group and controls achieving
a higher number of correctly identified positive emotions. This indicates that the Neutral
state included in the TASIT was difficult for both groups to identify. This may indicated a
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difference in the approach to the tasks between the older adults involved in this study and the
younger individuals on whom the TASIT was normed. It may be that as the task was
introduced and explained as an emotion recognition task to the participants involved in this
present study, this had more of a pronounced effect and they were more primed to identify an
emotion than not and there was some reluctance to acknowledge that no particular emotion
was evident, despite being informed that this would be true in some instances.
The ability of stroke participants and controls to correctly distinguish emotions as being
either positive or negative was examined by looking at the pattern of errors made by each of
the two groups. Studies have shown there may be separate abilities to identify different types
of stimuli. For example, the valence hypothesis (Borod, 1992; Liotti & Tucker, 1995) argues
that the right hemisphere is dominant for negative or unpleasant emotions, with the left
hemisphere dominant for positive or pleasant emotions. Errors were identified as being
within-type (e.g. an incorrectly identified positive emotion being identified for another
positive emotion) or outwith-type (e.g. an incorrectly identified positive emotion being
identified for a negative emotion).
Post-hoc analyses were conducted in order to assess the ability of stroke participants and
controls to correctly identify emotions as being either positive or negative. However, the
results of this analysis indicated no significant differences between stroke patients and
controls in correctly identifying a particular positive emotion as another positive emotion, or
a particular negative emotion as another negative emotion. The TASIT was normed on a
much younger age group due to the characteristics of the population used in its development.
These were individuals who had been involved in car accidents. At a consequence, the
normative sample were a younger cohort than the cohort expected in a stroke survivors
population and thus a control group was included in the current study.
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However, the authors of the TASIT describe this test as one on which normal adults may be
expected to 'perform near-ceiling on all subtests' (McDonald et al., 2002, p.9). This was
found not to be the case in this present study, with the control group achieving equally low
scores as the stroke patients. The total mean score provided by the authors for healthy adults
on Part I of the TASIT is 24.9 (89%) (maximum score = 28). The scores obtained in Part I
for the stroke group and controls in this present study were 20.0 (71%) and 20.2 (72%),
respectively. The data provided for the traumatic brain injured (TBI) group for Part I of the
TASIT is 19.8 (71%), which is very similar to the scores obtained by both the stroke patients
and controls. This raises questions regarding the participants involved in this present study
and methodological concerns, including the materials used. Each of these issues will be
discussed in more detail in later sections.
Briefly, however, there may be significant methodological disparities between this present
study and previous research. One important consideration is the materials used to test
emotion recognition abilities. Bowers et al., (1991), for example, found emotion recognition
deficits in individuals who had sustained lesions to the brain using a task for visual imagery
for facial emotion. Borod et al., (2000) also found impairments in brain-injured individuals
compared to healthy controls using words to convey emotion-laden messages. Both these
studies focused on discrete aspects of emotional processing, whereas the emotion recognition
task in this present study was multi-component and multi-modal. It is acknowledged that the
test used in this present study, the TASIT, is similar to other multi-modal batteries, such as
the Perception of Emotion Test (POET) (Egan et al., 1990). A comparison of these two tests
may usefully highlight some of the distinctions in the assessment of emotion recognition in
this present study.
The POET is a test designed to assess facial, prosodic and verbal perception across four
emotions. The TASIT also uses these abilities to assess emotional perception, though on a
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more expansive scale with the use of seven emotional states. Additionally, the POET alters
the conditions of presentation of stimuli (i.e., vision with sound/no sound or sound only)
thereby enabling comparisons to be made regarding which aspects of stimuli recognition
may be impaired. The TASIT, on the other hand, does not do this in its standard
administration and it is difficult to establish whether there are aspects of the TASIT that
enable individuals who may show deficits on emotional recognition tasks using one mode, to
achieve near normal scores.
2. Stroke participants with right-sided lesions will show a reduced ability in the
recognition of negative emotions compared to the recognition of positive
emotions
Several studies have examined the role of the right hemisphere in emotional processing.
There are a number of studies that suggest mechanisms in the right hemisphere which may
be also be involved in the comprehension of emotion (e.g. Heilman et al., 1984; Ross 1981).
There is some evidence that the left hemisphere processes the content of communications
and the right hemisphere processes the manner in which information is communicated. Also,
individuals with right hemisphere damage have been shown to have an impaired ability in
identifying the features of emotionally-laden stimuli, in both auditory and visual conditions
(Borod & Koff, 1990). It was hypothesised, therefore, that individuals identified as having
sustained damage to the right hemisphere would show an impaired ability in emotion
recognition relative to individuals who had sustained lesions in others areas of the brain.
The results indicated, however, that no significant differences were found in the ability to
identify positive or negative emotions in individuals with right-hemisphere lesions. Findings
from this present study would not appear to support the right-hemisphere hypothesis for
emotional perception proposed by Borod et al., (1998), who cited evidence from a study
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investigating emotional perception in stroke patients as supporting the right-hemisphere
hypothesis over the valence hypothesis. However, the valence hypothesis was not
investigated in this present study.
However, it is acknowledged that only broad categories were used in this present study and
the right hemisphere damaged group included individuals who had sustained lesions in the
posterior, anterior and subcortical regions. It may be, therefore, that the categorisation of
location of lesion as simply being right and left hemisphere was not sensitive enough to
discriminate between specific abilities. Previous studies have indicated that differences may
be observed in the perception of emotions when lesions are distinguished between posterior
and anterior areas within one hemisphere (and within a specific area such as the pre-frontal
cortex). Face perception, for example, is found to be impaired in some individuals following
a right hemisphere lesion, particularly when the lesion is located in the posterior area of the
brain (Hamsher et al., 1979; Benton, 1980).
3. Older control participants will show a reduced ability in the recognition of
negative emotions compared to younger controls
There is some evidence which suggests that emotional perception may be influenced by
ageing, with a decline occurring over time similar to other cognitive functions, such as speed
of processing, mental flexibility and some memory functions. Additionally, evidence from
neuroanatomical and behavioural studies have led some researchers to question whether rate
of ageing differs between the left and right hemispheres (e.g. Goldstein & Sheeley, 1981).
Emotional perception is seen as being chiefly a function of the right hemisphere and may
deteriorate if the right hemisphere was found to age more quickly than the left. McDowell et
al., (1994) investigated the hemi-ageing hypothesis but found little evidence to support this
view in emotion recognition. However, they suggested that elderly subjects had more
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difficulty processing negative affect, while their ability to process positive affect was equal
to that of younger subjects.
On this basis, therefore, it was decided to investigate the relationship between ability to
correctly identify emotional states and age within the control group. Analysis of these data
revealed no evidence of deterioration in emotion recognition with age amongst older adults,
either generally or in relation to either positive or negative emotions. This finding does,
however, support the findings from previous studies which have also failed to find
differences across the age range (e.g. Moreno et al., 1993). It is acknowledged, however, that
the spread of ages within the control group was largely restricted to older adults, with 94% of
controls being aged between 55 years and 82 years. However, as outlined in the previous
section, the performance of controls was notably worse than the younger-aged norms,
suggesting an age effect in emotion recognition.
4. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in social inference tasks
compared to controls
Theory of Mind (ToM) (Baron-Cohen, 1985) may be seen as a necessary component of
successful social interactions, which requires the ability to ascribe independent mental states
to oneself and to others. As previously outlined in section 1.4.1, these states involve desires,
beliefs, intentions and feelings and low scores on tasks assessing these abilities are cited as
evidence of deficits in psychosocial functioning. Happe et al., (1999), investigated acquired
deficits in ToM in individuals who had sustained lesions to the right hemisphere following a
stroke, hypothesising that impairments in emotion-related tasks seen following lesion to the
brain may be explained by deficits in ToM abilities. The evidence from such studies would
explain some of the psychosocial deficits observed in brain-injured individuals, including
some stroke survivors. The above hypothesis (4), therefore, was aimed at investigating social
awareness in individuals who had sustained injury to the brain by assessing their ability to
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infer meaning from differing modes of social communication, similar to that used in
investigated ToM functioning.
Part II of the TASIT investigates the ability to make inferences from communicative
exchanges between individuals and Part 11(a) involves the ability to identify between
sincerely meant verbal exchanges and verbal exchanges involving sarcasm. No significant
differences were observed between stroke participants and controls on this task, though it
would appear that both groups performed at a low level, with 10 (45%) of the stroke group
and 13 (76%) of controls obtaining a score of 75% correct or less. The means provided by
the authors for healthy adults indicate total mean for Part 11(a) to be 54.1 (90%)(maximum
possible correct = 60). The total mean scores for the stroke and control groups were 42.4
(71%) and 41.2 (69%) respectively.
A significant positive correlation was found within both groups between the two forms of
sarcasm, but not with sincere exchanges. This suggests that there is a common element to the
sarcasm conditions that is separate from the sincere exchange condition and would appear to
indicate an internal consistency of the authors' data. The fact that in both groups the
paradoxical form was slightly easier to identify than simple sarcasm may have to do with the
fact that some forms of simple sarcasm were quite subtle, whereas the paradoxical form of
the sarcastic exchanges simply didn't make sense unless they were interpreted as being
sarcastic.
It would appear, therefore, that there may be some evidence to support previous research
which suggests that subtle social and emotional cues are more difficult to identify for some
individuals. However, considerably more information is provided in the TASIT tasks to
enable participants to assess social inference than is available in tasks used by other studies.
In addition to verbal and prosodic information, there are also gestural, postural and
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(sometimes quite pronounced) facial cues available. It is difficult, therefore, to determine
where the difficulties may lie for those participants who found the task problematic.
5. Stroke participants will show a reduced ability in social comprehension tasks
compared to controls
Part 11(b) of the TASIT assesses an individual's ability to comprehend elements involved in
successful social interactions, including the ability to make inferences regarding intent
behaviour and verbal information and the ability to ascribe mental states to others. The above
hypothesis was tested using this part of the TASIT, whereby both stroke participants and
controls were required to make inferences about the message being conveyed by characters,
the characters' beliefs, their intentions and make an inference about the emotional state of
the character. Eighty-six percent of stroke participants and 88% of controls obtained a score
of 60%+ in the identification of the intention of characters and the information they were
conveying. This decreased to 64% of stroke patients and 59% of controls in the correct
identification of beliefs at the same level. Additionally, 55% of stroke participants but only
24% of controls obtained a total score of 75%+ in this task. Correlational analyses indicated
significant relationships between the different elements of this task in respect of the stroke
group, suggesting the ability to comprehend one aspect of social communication is related to
ability in comprehending the others. However, this was not found to be so clear-cut for the
control group. In these analyses, the ability to infer the emotional state of a character was
found to be related only to comprehending the character's intentions. Also, comprehension
of the characters' intentions was found not be related to comprehension of the message being
conveyed. These results were unexpected and raise questions about the performance of the
control group.
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While no significant differences were found between the control group and the stroke group
on tasks of social inference and comprehension, this was due to the fact that controls
performed at as low a level and sometimes (though not significantly) lower than stroke
patients. From the information provided by the authors of the TASIT, normal adults would
be expected to perform at a 'near-ceiling' level. This was not found to be the case. There are
a number of possible reasons one may put forward to account for these findings: (1) the
stroke patients involved in this study have no psychosocial difficulties and all adults within
the age range tested in this study would perform at the level observed in both the stroke
group and control group; (2) there are problems with sensitivity and specificity associated
with the TASIT; (3) the task performance of controls was influenced by an unknown factor
which caused them to score as low as stroke patients. These issues will be further discussed
in the following sections.
6. In stroke participants, a positive and significant association will be shown
between performance on measures of executive function and tasks of emotion
recognition
As discussed in previous chapters, the frontal lobes of the brain mediate aspects of a wide
range of cognitive functions and some individuals demonstrate quite pronounced deficits in
cognitive functioning and/or changes in their personality following lesions in this area.
Changes with lesions in the frontal areas of the brain can present as socially inappropriate or
disinhibited behaviours. Importantly, executive function processes are viewed primarily as
being mediated by the pre-frontal cortex and include self-monitoring the adequacy and
correctness of behaviours (Malloy et al., 1998). Personality changes are often reported by
individuals close to those who have sustained injury to this part of the brain. Increased
impulsivity and deficits in motivation and the ability to plan, organise and sequence actions
are common sequelae with executive function difficulties.
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The tasks used to test the above hypothesis (6) involved the California Oral Word
Association (COWA) task, the Modified Card Sort Test (MCST) and the DEX
Questionnaires taken from the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome
(BADS). The scores obtained by stroke patients on tasks of executive function varied quite
considerably among individuals. On the category aspect of the COWA, for example, total
responses to naming as many animals in one minute as possible ranged from 7 to 21.
However, the total responses over three minutes for words beginning with given letters
ranged from 8 to 50. On the MCST ability to set-shift, problem-solve and utilise feedback
also varied, with some stroke patients failing to obtain any sets at all. Only two individuals
successfully completed this task, indicating that almost all stroke patients demonstrated at
least some degree of executive function difficulties. The responses obtained from the DEX
questionnaires, however, did not reflect this, with only a trend indicated for stroke patients to
rate themselves with more executive difficulties than did the staff. This latter issue is
discussed in more detail in a later section.
Correlational analyses between the scores obtained on the tasks described above showed
significant positive relationships between all of the scores, with the exception of the DEX
Questionnaires. Neither the self-rated nor the independently-rated questionnaires showed a
significant relationship either to each other or to any of the tasks of executive function.
However, the direction of the relationships indicated both to be negatively correlated with
executive function tasks and positively correlated with each other, which is what would be
expected.
Deficits in executive functioning following damage to the frontal lobes have been reported in
cases of neurological pathology, such as cerebrovascular disease, as well as lesions
following traumatic brain injury (e.g. Levin et al., 1991). Altered psychosocial and emotional
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functioning following such an injury includes impairments in emotion-related learning (Rolls
et al., 1994), and impairments in identifying facial and emotional expression have been
shown in individuals who exhibit socially inappropriate behaviours (Homak et al., 1996).
Against this background of research suggesting reduced ability in emotion-related tasks
following injury to areas of the cerebral cortex associated with executive functioning, it was
hypothesised that deficits in executive functioning following brain injury would be positively
and significantly associated with impaired performance on tasks of emotion recognition in
stroke survivors who show poor executive function abilities. The correlational analyses
carried out partially supported this hypothesis as almost all executive function tasks were
positively associated with the identification of both positive and negative emotional states.
These findings suggest a link between the frontal areas of the brain involved in executive
functions and abilities required to distinguish emotional states in others.
7. Stroke participants with lower scores on measures of executive function will
also show lower scores on tasks of social inference
As previously outlined, the ToM hypothesis postulates that there is a developmental deficit
in ToM abilities in autism, but similarities have been noted between the behaviour of autistic
children and adults who have suffered damage to the frontal lobes (Damasio & Maurer,
1978). A number of studies have provided some evidence that such a deficit may result
following trauma to the brain, including individuals who had suffered a stroke (Happe et al.,
1999). Additionally, impaired ToM abilities have also been found following frontal lobe
surgery, where pre-morbid ToM functioning was documented (Happe et al., 2001). This
evidence suggests that impairment in ToM abilities may be acquired following lesions to the
brain, particularly the frontal regions which are involved in mediating executive functions.
Additionally, social interaction difficulties seen in individuals with impaired ToM may well
be reflected in adults who have suffered a stroke. It was hypothesised, therefore, that
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performance on tasks assessing executive functioning abilities would be positively
associated with the ability to understand the mental states of others, as indicated by tasks
measuring the ability to distinguish between different types of communication (sincere
exchanges and sarcasm).
Analysis of the data indicated that none of the executive tasks showed a relationship with
sincere exchanges but four of the six correlations between the two types of sarcasm
exchanges and executive tasks indicated significant positive associations. These findings
suggest a positive relationship between executive functioning abilities and abilities to
distinguish between subtle and more complex social interactions. This would support
previous findings which have found evidence to suggest relationships between the processes
involved in ToM tasks and deficits in psychosocial functioning.
8. Stroke participants with lower scores on measures of executive function will
also show lower scores on tasks of social comprehension
The background to the above hypothesis (8) is as discussed for the previous hypothesis.
Social comprehension abilities were measured by a part of the TASIT that assesses the
ability to make inferences about the intention of a character, what they are trying to say, their
beliefs and their emotional state. Analysis of the data indicated positive significant
relationships between executive functioning and scores on almost all aspects of this task.
These findings appear to support previous findings within this present study as well as those
from the literature that suggest a relationship between frontal lobe processes and abilities in
psychosocial functioning.
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4.2.1 Implications of Findings for Clinical Practice
The findings from this present study do not support an overall effect of reduced social
perception relative to controls. However, they do suggest an association between social
perception and executive functioning following stroke. Executive function has been shown
to be associated with various aspects of social functioning including: appreciation and
comprehension of more complex forms of social communication; inferring the intentions,
beliefs and emotional states of others from social exchanges. If this is the case, the
consequences of these findings could have implications for the rehabilitation of post-stroke
patients. The rehabilitation of stroke patients involves a considerable amount of interaction
with a range of professionals, especially for the more severely affected patient. Such
interactions would not only be necessary for assessment and/or physical, language,
psychological or medical interventions but would also constitute providing information to
the individual.
The findings from this study suggest almost all of the stroke patients assessed showed some
degree of executive functioning difficulties. The consequences of impaired executive
functioning are multi-faceted and wide-ranging and imply other frontal lobe difficulties.
Individuals who demonstrate such difficulties may, for example, experience a degree of
social isolation, which may then be exacerbated by poor problem solving, reduced insight
and emotional lability (Levin et ah, 1982; Prigatano, 1986). Such a situation may have
negative consequences for the well-being of the individual. There is considerable literature
describing the range of affective disorders often experienced following stroke (e.g.
Robinson, 1998). The importance for professionals of recognising alterations in emotional
functioning and behaviour post-stroke has been outlined by Bogonsslavsky (2002).
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4.2.2 Ethical Considerations
There are a number of ethical considerations that must be taken into account when undertaking
psychological research as outlined in the Code of Conduct published by the British Psychological
Society (2000). The issues in question involve consideration of the costs and benefits of the research
and the obligations of the researcher to all participants. Clark-Carter (1997) suggests the planning of
research, the conduct of the researcher and the subsequent reporting of data obtained to be the key
areas in which ethical considerations are vital. Section 2.5 outlines the specific details of the
procedures used in this present study.
It is acknowledged that the participants involved in this present study may be seen as being from a
vulnerable group within society. Individuals who have suffered a stroke may be less able than
otherwise healthy individuals to fully appreciate research in which they have been requested to
participate due to the psychological and neuropsychological difficulties such individuals may
experience. However, given the nature of the research in question it was felt that the possible benefits
resulting from the study in the form of an increased understanding of social perception following
stroke outweighed any potentially negative effects, such as psychological distress or fatigue, which
was considered by the Grampian Ethics Committee to be minimal. Had an individual expressed a wish
to end their participation or either indicated distress or appeared to be distressed in any way, testing
would have ceased immediately. However, this did not occur. It is important to stress that no
individual who agreed to participate was considered to be incapable of giving their consent in the
judgement of either the medical or nursing staff or in the opinion of the author.
4.3 Methodological Issues
There are a number of methodological issues related to this present study which will be
discussed in the sections below.
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4.3.1 Statistical Issues
The decision to use non-parametric instead of parametric analyses was made for the
following reasons:
■ because two outliers were found within the stroke group - one for age and one for
education- and as two of the important tasks of executive function are significant
influenced by both these factors, a conservative approach was adopted
■ the relatively lower number of controls (17) suggested that parametric tests may not
be the best approach for data analyses in this group.
It is acknowledged that the application ofmultiple comparison procedures used in this study
may raise the issue of increasing the probability of making Type I errors (Howell, 1992). It
was decided to try and control for these errors by dividing the p value (0.05) by the number
of tests undertaken (Dancey & Reidy (1999) p. 173). Thus, an analysis using 21 Wilcoxon
matched pairs signed ranks tests was carried out using a p value of (0.002) for significance.
There are differing opinions as to whether experimental hypotheses should be uni-directional
(one-tailed) or bi-directional (two-tailed). Green & D'Oliviera (1982) argue that it is
preferable to attempt an explanation of human behaviour in terms of predicting behaviour in
one direction where possible. This was the approach adopted in this present study, that where
possible hypotheses were based upon predications from the literature and therefore theory-
driven, rather than exploratory.
4.3.2 Stroke Participants
There may be issues regarding the inclusion of a larger number of post-stroke survivors who
have remained as in-patients over a long period. Clearly such individuals are more severely
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disabled by their stroke than the larger number of individuals who suffer a stroke but are
relatively unimpaired. While it could be argued that this study investigated strokes of greater
severity implicitly by including individuals from a rehabilitation in-patient unit, no precise
measure of stroke severity was used. There are also issues around medication use by stroke
patients. It was acknowledged that such individuals would be on a considerable medication
regimen but it was beyond the scope of this study to comment on the effects of the large
array of medication involved (as well as potential polypharmacy effects). However, each
participant was briefly assessed prior to both assessment sessions to ensure that they could
respond in an appropriate manner and that their behaviour did not raise doubts regarding
their performance on tasks.
It is also acknowledged that some of the literature cited reporting studies which suggested
difficulties in the perception of emotion following brain lesions were carried out on
individuals who had sustained brain lesions following mild or traumatic brain injury and
these cases may have confounding implications. Individuals who sustain traumatic brain
injury, for example, often have tearing or shearing damage which does not normally occur in
stroke.
4.3.4 Controls
The controls used in this study appeared to perform on all tasks at a level very similar to the
stroke patients and at a lower level than would be expected from the information provided by
the authors of the TASIT. However, the controls (and stroke patients) may actually have
performed at a normal level for their age, as the TASIT had been normed on a much younger
age group. An attempt to establish whether age affected emotion recognition scores in this
study using controls indicted no relationship between these factors. However, there are a
number of issues that may be pertinent to the task performance of this control group. These
were individuals recruited from Orthopaedic and Medicine for the Elderly wards at
99
Woodend Hospital and may not have fully engaged with the tasks for a number of reasons.
As with the stroke patients, these individuals may have been on a number of medications
which may have influenced their ability to perform at an optimal level. Additionally, pain
may also have been a factor. While none of the controls indicated that they were in any
discomfort, pain levels were not recorded or monitored, except in an informal manner.
4.3.5 Mood
Robinson (1998) postulates that mental health issues, particularly anxiety and depression, are
commonly experienced by stroke survivors. Symptoms associated with these conditions and
also features of adjustment, such as irritability, apathy and withdrawal may influence
psychosocial behaviours. The low scores obtained by the stroke patients on emotion
recognition tasks may therefore be influenced by mood factors (though this would not
explain the scores obtained by the controls). Robinson (1998) describes depression as being
one of the most frequent emotional disorders experienced by stroke survivors that also has a
significant impact on rehabilitation and recovery. A study looking at the prevalence of
depression in post-stroke survivors found the prevalence of depression in hospitalised stroke
patients to be similar to that of stroke survivors in community samples, with 27% of 103
individuals meeting the criteria outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3rd edition) for major depression (Robinson et ah, 1983). A measure of mood,
such as the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), might have
been a useful tool to have included in this study.
4.3.6 Materials
Much of the research which has shown deficits in the perception of emotion following brain
lesions has focused on specific aspects such as facial expression; for example, matching
emotion-related stimuli with pictures of facial expression (e.g. Stone et ah, 1996) or
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discriminating between emotionally-intoned recordings (e.g. Brosgole & Weisman, 1995).
However, the TASIT used in the present study assessed social perception abilities across a
range of communication channels, including: facial, prosodic, gestural and postural. This
offers an extensive amount of information to the individual from which to infer the emotion
being expressed or the message being communicated. Differences were found in the use of
gestures as cues to decoding emotion by younger and older adults in video sequences, with
older adults making more overall errors (Montepare et ah, 1999). However, the video
sequences used were silent and the faces blurred. But in a study by Brosgole & Weisman
(1983), senile elderly adults was found to be able to recognise emotion expressed posturally,
despite showing pronounced impairments in recognising facial affect. Evidence from these
studies indicates that a wide range of information is used, either consciously or
unconsciously, in the perception of emotion.
The TASIT, therefore, may actually be more akin to real-life situations. Individuals may
show impairments in emotion-related tasks under laboratory conditions but show no such
deficits in their performance on the TASIT or reflect few difficulties in their day-to-day
lives. For the majority or individuals few social interactions involve only one communication
channel, therefore there is an abundance of information usually available to an individual. A
stroke patient, for example, may show impairments in the ability to identify the emotion
Angry from a 2-dimensional stimulus array but such individuals have a wealth of other
information that they may use consciously or unconsciously to aid their understanding in the
real world. It has been shown that individuals who demonstrate impairments in particular
cognitive domains under testing conditions do not always show similar difficulties in their
everyday lives (Lezak, 1995).
However, the TASIT was developed with TBI patients who often show significantly more
deficits or severity of damage following brain injury than stroke patients. Trauma to the
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brain often involves contra-coup injuries, oedema, shearing, tearing and the consequences of
open-head and/or high velocity injury such as infection or damage from bone fragmentation.
It might have been anticipated, therefore, that brain-trauma individuals would show more
pronounced difficulties on this task than stroke survivors but this was not shown to the case.
As outlined in section 4.2, both stroke participants and controls obtained scores very similar
to that obtained by younger TBI patients.
The decision to have the DEX Q completed by nursing staff was based upon the fact that the
majority of stroke participants had been inpatients since their stroke and relatives had little
opportunity to observe then closely in social circumstances other than a generally one-to-one
basis. Hospital staff, on the other hand, were provided the opportunity to engage and observe
their patients in a variety of situations. Staff were requested to have the questionnaires
completed by the members of staff who best knew a particular patient, whether that was a
qualified named nurse or auxiliary carer. However, the responses obtained from staff
members reflected similar ratings as each of the patients had given themselves. In validation
studies, relatives generally rated individuals with executive difficulties significantly higher
on the DEX questionnaire than did individuals themselves, indicated reduced insight by
patients (Wilson et al., 1996). Given that the majority of stroke patients in this study had
some degree of executive functioning difficulties, one would have expected the
independently-rated questionnaire scores to be higher, even if not to a significant degree.
This may reflect the staff members' approach to completing the questionnaire, in that they
may have compared the named individual with other (more impaired) stroke patients. Thus,
low executive impairments were observed relative to other stroke survivors.
4.4 Considerations for Future Research
There are a number of aspects of this present study that raise issues that might be addressed
in future research. These include:
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■ further investigation of the TASIT in normal older adults
■ investigation of associations between executive function and social perception in
other populations, such as Huntington's Disease or Multiple Sclerosis
■ the relationship between a more accurate identification of lesion location and
emotion recognition in stroke patients
■ an investigation ofmood and social perception in stroke patients
4.5 Conclusion
Although individuals who have sustained a brain lesion following stroke have been shown to
be impaired in emotion recognition tasks relative to controls, this finding was not replicated
using the measures employed in this study. The findings of this present study indicated no
significant differences in the recognition of emotion between individuals who have sustained
lesions to the brain following stroke and age-matched controls. Also, no significant
differences were found on tasks of social perception relative to controls. However, there is
some evidence to suggest that rather than the stroke group performing tasks of social
perception at a normal level, the control group may have performed at an unexpectedly low
level. Additionally, the findings would not appear to support the right-hemisphere hypothesis
for emotional perception (e.g. Borod et al., 1998). Also, no association was found between
age and emotion recognition, though this may reflect methodological issues within the
control group on whom this part of the study was focused. Significant and positive
associations were observed between executive function and both emotion recognition tasks
and tasks of social perception.
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PRACTICE ITEM
A. Is Ruth trying to pressure Gary into helping her? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to say it's OK if he doesn't help her? Y N DK
C. Does she think he should stop what he is doing and help her? Y N DK
D. Is she annoyed with him? Y N DK
1. WEEKEND AWAY
A. Is he seriously suggesting they invite other family members? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say he doesn't want her relatives to come? Y N DK
C. Does she think he wants her relatives to come? Y N DK
d. Is he annoyed with her? Y N DK
2. DATE
A. Is Gary criticising Michael for dating Arme? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say it's a mistake to date Anne? Y N DK
C.' Does Gary think Anne is a good date? Y N DK
d: Is he openly impressed that Michael is dating Anne? Y N DK
REPORT :V- . ...
A. Is Ruth denying the report took a lot ofwork? Y "v N DK
B. Is she trying to say she had a lazy, relaxing weekend? Y N DK
c.. Does Michael think she took it easy on the weekend? Y N DK
d. Does Ruth seem happy about working all weekend? Y N DK
LUNCH .J .
A. Is Ruth reluctandy agreeing to go to the lunch? Y N
:
DK
B. Is she trying to say she's happy to help out with a salad? Y N DK
C. Does she think the lunch will be fun? " Y N DK
d. Does she seem pleased about going to the lunch? • . . Y N DK
5. TIE
A. Is Ruth encouraging Michael to wear the tie? Y N DK
B.
*
Is she trying to say the tie is unsuitable for ajbusiness meeting? Y N DK
C. Does she think the tie is'suitable for a btisiness meeting? Y N DK
D. Does she seem to be impressed by his choice? Y N DK
6. CLASS
v • - 1' .
A. Is R.uth trying tip make Michael feel OK? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to say that he's causing a big problem? Y N DK
C. Does she b.elieve he's too busy to take the class? Y N DK
D. Is she annoyed with him? Y N DK
A. Is Gary trying to make Ruth feel bad? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say that she looks OK? Y N DK
C. Does she think he's joking with her? Y N DK
D. Is he angry with her? Y N DK
8. PASSPORT
A. Is Keith seriously trying to make Gary think he's lost his ticket? Y N DK
B. Is Keith trying to say that his ticket and passport are safe? Y N DK
C. By the end of the scene: Does Gary believe Keith has his ticket? Y N DK
D. Is Keith openly pleased about Gary's concern? Y N DK
9. HARD DAY , i
A. Is Ruth trying to make Michael feel appreciated? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to say he's been a big help? Y N DK
C Does she think he has worked hard? Y N : DK
D. . Is she annoyed with him? •; ) v r.-,: . Y N DK
10. MOVIES
A. Is Michael agreeing with Ruth about the movie? Y i N •- rV DK
B. Is he trying.to say he thought the actors were good? ' _v Y "V; ; \ N y ■ • DK
c Did he think the movie was bad? ' V • Y ■ Vy.; N : y->y, DK -
D. Is he openly'pleased that he saw the movie? Y , N ; DK
II. TICKETS A i vy 4 1/Vy;''
A. Is Michael trying to show he appreciates Gary getting the tickets? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say he's pleased about the tickets? . Y N . DK
c. By the end of the scene, does Gary think Michael wants to go? Y '• N DK
D. Is Michael annoyed Gary got him the tickets? Y N . DK
12. BOXES, , •; • .... ..
A. Is Gary trying to niake Michael feel guilty? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say Michael should take it easy? Y N DK
C. Does he think Michael is being lazy? Y ■ N DK
D. Is he annoyed with Michael? Y N DK
13. PROMOTION
A- Is Ruth sending Michael up about his chances of a promotion? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to,say he's worked really well? Y N DK
C. Does she thinkjhe deserves a promotion? Y N DK
D. Would she like him to get the promotion? Y N DK
14. SHIRT * j .*•
A. Is Ruth reassuring Gary that the shirt is nice? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to say the shirt is awful? Y N DK
C. Does she think the shirt's OK? Y N DK
D. Is she happy for him to wear the shirt? Y N DK
15. DRESS
A. Is Michael being complimentary about the dress? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say the dress looks cheap? Y N DK
C. Does he like the dress? Y N DK
D. Does he think Ruth's sister paid a lot for the dress? Y N DK
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No. items correct for each emotion:
No. of positive vs negative emotion items
correct:
TOTAL No. OF ITEMS CORRECT:
Positive emotions : (i) + (ii) + (iii) - Negative emotions: (iv) + (v) + (vi) + (vii) -
Positive + Negative emotions =
:□ TASIT A:
J PART 2 ~
9B SOCIAL INFERENCE (Minimal) -
ipany RESPONSE FORM
ICE ITEM
Uith trying to pressure Gary into helping her?
ae trying to say it's OK if he doesn't help her?
is she think he should stop what he is doing and help her?
ae annoyed with him?
EEKEND AWAY
e seriously suggesting they invite other family members?
e trying to say he doesn't want her relatives to come?
is she think he wants her relatives to come?
e annoyed with her?
TE
lary criticising Michael for dating Anne?
e trying to say it's a mistake to date Anne?
;s Gary think Anne is a good date?
e openly inapressed that Michael is dating Anne?
PORT
tuth denying the report took a lot ofwork?
ae trying to say she had a lazy, relaxing weekend?
is Michael think she took it easy on the weekend?
is Ruth seem happy about working all weekend?
NCH
mth reluctantly agreeing to go to the lunch?
ae trying to say she's happy to help out with a salad?
is she think the lunch will be fun?
is she seem pleased about going to the lunch?
oath encouraging Michael to wear the tie?
;he trying to say the tie is unsuitable for a business meeting?
is she think the tie is suitable for a business meeting?
is she seem to be impressed by his choice?
ASS
aith trying to make Michael feel OK?
ae trying to say that he's causing a big problem?
is she believe he's too busy to take the class?






























A. Is Gary trying to make Ruth feel bad? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say that she looks OK? Y N DK
C. Does she think he's joking with her? Y N DK
D. Is he angry with her? Y N DK
8. PASSPORT
A. Is Keith seriously trying to make Gary think he's lost his ticket? Y N DK
B. Is Keith trying to say that his ticket and passport are safe? Y N DK
C. By the end of the scene: Does Gary believe Keith has his ticket? Y N DK
D. Is Keith openly pleased about Gary's concern? Y N DK
9. HARD DAY
A. Is Ruth trying to make Michael feel appreciated? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to say he's been a big help? Y N DK
C. Does she think he has worked hard? Y N DK
D. Is she annoyed with him? Y N DK
10. MOVIES
A. Is Michael agreeing with Ruth about the movie? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say he thought the actors were good? Y N DK
C. Did he think the movie was bad? Y N DK
D. Is he openly pleased that he saw the movie? Y N DK
1 1. TICKETS
A. Is Michael trying to show he appreciates Gary getting the tickets? Y . N DK
B. Is he trying to say he's pleased about the tickets? Y N DK
C. By the end of the scene, does Gary think Michael wants to go? Y N DK
D. Is Michael annoyed Gary got him the tickets? Y N DK
12. BOXES
A. Is Gary trying to make Michael feel guilty? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say Michael should take it easy? Y N DK
C. Does he think Michael is being lazy? Y N DK
D. Is he annoyed with Michael? Y N DK
13. PROMOTION
A. Is Ruth sending Michael up about his chances of a promotion? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to say he's worked really well? Y N DK
C. Does she think he deserves a promotion? Y N DK
D. Would she like him to get the promotion? Y N DK
14. SHIRT
A. Is Ruth reassuring Gary that the shirt is nice? Y N DK
B. Is she trying to say the shirt is awful? Y N DK
C. Does she think the shirt's OK? Y N DK
D. Is she happy for him to wear the shirt? Y N DK
15. DRESS
A. Is Michael being complimentary about the dress? Y N DK
B. Is he trying to say the dress looks cheap? Y N DK
C. Does he like the dress? Y N DK





CONTROLLED ORAL WORD ASSOCIATION TEST
Give me the names of as many animals/occupations as you can think of.
I am going to give you a letter and I would like you to tell me as many words as you
can think of that begin with that letter excluding proper nouns (i.e. names), numbers
and the same word with a different suffix (i.e. all, always, altogether, e.t.c.). The
























This questionnaire looks at some of the difficulties that people
sometimes experience. We would like you to read the following
statements/and rate them on a five-point scale according to
•your own experience:
1 I have problems understanding what other people mean unless they
keep things simple and straightforward
Do n q Db d4
Never Occasionally - Sometimes Fairly often Very often
2 I act without thinking, doing the first thing that comes to mind
; Do o Q n /o, .
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
3 I sometimes talk about events or details that never actually happened,
but I believe did happen
Do Di D2 D3 D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
4 I have difficulty thinking ahead or planning for the future
v do. di D2 Db d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
5 I sometimes get pver-excited about things and can be a bit 'over the
top' at these times
. do di d2 d3 d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
6 I get events mixed up with each other, and get confused about the
correct order of events
do di d2 ds d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
7 I have difficulty realizing the extent of my problems and am unrealistic
• 'about the future
□0: Q □; IJ3 U4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
8 I am lethargic, or unenthusiastic about things
.do di d2 ds d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
9 I do or say embarrassing things when in the company of others
do^ di o2 -db ■" d]4 : \ - *
• Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
10
; j reallywant to do something one minute, but couldn't care less about
. it the next •
. ■ . . , ■
do di d2 o3 • -d4
{NeverOccasionally Sometimes. . Fairly often .Veryoften//
{•//////v "■■■ : ■ // '■>/// - ;/// %~:a•PMxM
• : .•/-..' V ... - / ; ' r\.' ■ ■■././ ■. --.-v.'.
/ .ST •-*. ■ . • .. . /.. / c 4V-: " •
:
■ '■
. " ' * .-'/,//
11 J have difficulty showing emotion '/ '0 y
do*'di d2 Db ' PP
Never .Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Veryoften
12 1 lose my temper at the slightest thing
"."/' ££'*?: r'/>
do di d2 Db d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
13 lam unconcerned about how 1 should behave in certain situations
do. di d2 Db p4
Never / Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
14 1 find it hard to stop repeating saying or doing things once I've
started
do di D2 Db . d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
15 I tend to be very restless, and 'can't sit still' for any length of time
Do -Di D2 v;yD3|;v;:D4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
16 I find it difficult to stop myself from doing something even if I know I
shouldn't
do|di d2 db:; d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
17 I will say one thing, but will do something different
do di d2 ob,:'.. ~|4
. Never "Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Veryoften
18 I find it difficult to keep my mind on something, and am easily
distracted
do.;;,pi i a L js d4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Veryoften
19 I have trouble making decisions, or deciding what I want to do
/ gKli^igo!
.Never Occasionally Sometimes . Fairly often j, Veryoften




.- {Never / Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
P-«•'•VS-Dp'PP'D'
•
• •- ~ ••••; ■ - - y-
: Copyright © 1996, the authors: No part of this publication may be reproduced/ :
. in whole or in pail in any form (except by reviewers for the public press) without ,
'.written permission from the publishers.'BADS, ISBN 1 874261 95 4 ; - {
Thames ValleyTest Company, 7-9 The Green, Flempton, Bury St Edmunds,'.














This questionnaire looks at some of the difficulties that people
sometimes experience. We would like you to read the following
statements, and rate them on a five-point scale according to
your experience'of - Ithp subject]:
1 Has problems understanding what other people mean unless they
keep things simple and straightforward
□o O-^-.n OB Dr.
Never Occasionally 'Sometimes Fairly often Very often
2 Acts without thinking, doing the first thing that comes to mind
□. a;,-: q q
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
3 Sometimes talks about events or details that never actually happened,
buts/he believes did happen
□o Q: n a cu
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
4 Has difficulty thinking ahead or planning for the future
Elo Q EE2 E3 I U
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
5 Sometimes gets over-excited about things and can be a bit 'over the
top' at these times
□ 0 □, : Eh ES E4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
6 Gets events mixed up with each other, and gets confused about the
correct order of events
□0 □, Eh E3 n4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
7 Has difficulty realizing the extent of his/her problems and is
unrealistic about the future jS'1" .
□0 □,' * n n a
Never Occasionally . Sometimes Fairly often Very often
8 Seems lethargic, or unenthusiastic about things
□0 □, e2 E3 E4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
9 Does or says embarrassing things when in the company of others
□0 EE; - 1 Eh O3 I I4
Never Occasionally ■ Sometimes Fairly often. Very often
10 Reallywants to do something one minute, but couldn't care less about
it the next
Elo EE EE2 [,j3 El4
• Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
11 Has difficulty showing emotion - 5 "
Do Dl tE2 EE3 EU '
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
12 Loses his/her temper at the slightest thing
Do Ei E2 EE E4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
13 Seems unconcerned about how s/he should behave in certain
situations
Eo Ei E2 E3 E4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
14 Finds it hard to stop repeating saying or doing things once
started
Eo Ei EE2 IEJ 3 E4 .
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
15 Tends to be very restless, and 'can't sit still' for any length of time
Eo Ei E2 E3 E4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
16 Finds it difficult to stop doing something even if s/he knows s/he
shouldn't
Eo Ei E2 E3 E4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
17 Will say one thing, but will do something different
Eo Ei O2 i E3 E4
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often










19 Has trouble making decisions, or deciding what s/he wants to do
□0 Q i\ a□«.,
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
20 Is unaware of, or unconcerned about, how others feel about his/her
behaviour ..' ' '
□0 Q O2 Q □<
Never Occasionally Sometimes Fairly often Very often
Copyright © 1996, the authors: No part pf this publication may be reproduced,
in whole or in part in any form (except by reviewers for the public press) without
written permission from the publishers. BADS, ISBN 1 874261 95 4 . :
Thames Valley Test Company, 7-9 The Green, Flempton, Bury St Edmunds,
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Appendix 7
Information sheet for Patients
Information Sheet
Project: An Exploration of Social Perception and Executive Function
Following Stroke
Introduction
I would like to invite you to take part in a research project to enable us learn more
about people's experiences following a stroke and how to help them more effectively.
Background
Sometimes after having a stroke a number of individuals have been reported
experiencing some difficulties in tasks requiring, for example, problem-solving and
initiation. This is sometimes referred to as Executive Functioning. They also
sometimes experience problems interacting with other people, such as recognising
emotions in others, even though they did not have these difficulties before their
illness. This combination of psychological difficulties and social perception problems
can make recovery from stroke more difficult and may take longer as a result.
The purpose of this study is to examine in more detail what social perception
difficulties people do experience after having a stroke (if any), and to see whether
this has any effect on they way they behave.
What will I have to do?
This project involves watching a video of actors in different situations and answering
questions about their behaviour. The video is in two parts and will take about 45
minutes altogether. You will also be asked to do a few short tasks and complete a
questionnaire, which will take about another 45 minutes to do. The researcher,
Angus Lorimer, would explain the questionnaire and the tasks to you and will answer
any questions you may have regarding the project.
l
Patient Notes
I would also like to request permission to review your file / notes for information,
e.g. about the type of stroke you experienced. This information will be kept in the
strictest confidence.
Do I have to take part?
No, taking part in this study is voluntary. If you decide not to take part, you do not
have to give a reason. Any treatment or support you receive will not be affected as a
result of your decision.
Confidentiality
Each participant in the study will be assigned a code and all information gathered
during this study regarding individuals will be coded and known only to the
researcher and will be kept strictly confidential.
What to do now?
If you would like to take part in the study or would like to know more about it, tell
your nurse and he or she will contact me. If you wish, you may contact me directly
yourself at the address or telephone number below and I would be happy to talk to
you.
Thank you very much for considering taking part in this study. Please discuss this
matter with you family, friends or a member of staff if you wish.
Angus Lorimer
Psychologist in Clinical Training
Dept of Clinical Neuropsychology
Ward 40, ARI
Aberdeen





An Exploration of Social Perception and Executive Function Following Stroke
Name:
I have read the information on this study and have had the opportunity to talk it
over with Angus Lorimer. I have also had the opportunity to ask any questions. I
have been told what the study is for and understand what will happen. I know that I
do not have to take part and that I can withdraw from the study at any time. If I do
not want to take part, or if I decide to withdraw, I have been assured that my
treatment and support will not be affected in any way.
I also understand that my name will not be known to anyone apart from the person
who interviews me arid that all information will be treated in the strictest confidence.
I hereby fully and freely consent to take part in this study, which has been explained
to me satisfactorily.
Signature of Participant:
Date: Tick for verbal response *
I confirm that I have explained to the participant the nature and purpose of this




* Signature of Witness:
Date:
This form be held in Section A of the patient's notes.
Appendix 9
Information Sheet for Controls
Information Sheet For Individuals Who Have Not Had a Stroke
Project: An Exploration of Social Perception and Executive Function
Following Stroke
Introduction
As someone who has not had a stroke, I would like to invite you to take part in a
research project to enable us learn more about people's experiences following a
stroke and how to help them more effectively. In order to do this I need to compare
individuals who have had a stroke with individuals who have not.
Background
Sometimes after having a stroke a number of individuals have been reported
experiencing some difficulties in tasks requiring, for example, problem-solving and
initiation. This is sometimes referred to as Executive Functioning. They also
sometimes experience problems interacting with other people, such as recognising
emotions in others, even though they did not have these difficulties before their
illness. This combination of psychological difficulties and social perception problems
can make recovery from stroke more difficult and may take longer as a result.
The purpose of this study is to examine in more detail what social perception
difficulties people do experience after having a stroke (if any), and to see whether
this has any effect on they way they behave.
What will I have to do?
The part of the project I would like you to participate in involves watching a video of
actors in different situations and answering questions about their behaviour. The
video is in two parts and will take about 45 minutes altogether. The researcher,
Angus Lorimer, will be happy to answer any questions you may have regarding the
project.
i
Do I have to take part?
No, taking part in this study is voluntary. If you decide not to take part, you do not
have to give a reason. Any treatment or support you receive will not be affected as a
result of your decision.
Confidentiality
Each participant in the study will be assigned a code and all information gathered
during this study regarding individuals will be coded and known only to the
researcher and will be kept strictly confidential.
What to do now?
If you would like to take part in the study or would like to know more about it, tell
your nurse and he or she will contact me. If you wish, you may contact me directly
yourself at the address or telephone number below and I would be happy to talk to
you.
Thank you very much for considering taking part in this study. Please discuss this
matter with you family, friends or a member of staff if you wish.
Angus Lorimer
Psychologist in Clinical Training
Dept of Clinical Neuropsychology
Woodend Hospital
Aberdeen
Tel: (01224) 556770 or 554350
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